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ABSTRACT
INTUITION IN EMPLOYEE SELECTION: EXAMINING THE CONDITIONS FOR
ACCURATE INTUITIVE HIRING DECISIONS
by
Vinod U. Vincent
In complex organizational environments, managers often rely on intuition to make
decisions. Research has found intuition to be helpful when the task is complex; the
decision maker is a domain expert; and when the decision environment has a high level
of uncertainty, complexity, time pressure, insufficient data, and more than one reasonable
solution. However, in employee selection, which is a decision environment that typically
has the aforementioned characteristics that are conducive for intuition, scholars discount
the usefulness of intuition in favor of more objective, analytical selection methods such
as specific aptitude (e.g. sales ability) tests. A reason for the lack of academic support for
intuitive hiring is that research in employee selection has not thoroughly examined
contextual factors that impact an interviewer’s ability to make an accurate intuitive hiring
decision (i.e., one that results in selecting the best candidate out of multiple viable
options). The purpose of this study was to explore such factors. More specifically, this
study examined the impact of interviewer expertise, cognitive style, and procedural
accountability on the accuracy of intuitive hiring decisions when recruiting for complex
jobs. The hypotheses were tested via a two-part experimental study that used expert (N =
79) and non-expert (N = 83) interviewer samples. The results demonstrate that, when
recruiting for complex jobs, interviewer expertise does increase the accuracy of intuitive
vi

hiring decisions. The findings underscore the importance of domain expertise in intuitive
decision-making and have a number of theoretical and practical implications to employee
selection and the broader field of organizational decision-making.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Effective decision-making is critical to the success of an organization. Yet, a
dilemma faced by many managers is how to make effective decisions in complex,
ambiguous, and time-constrained environments as is typically found in organizational
settings today. In such environments, there is often an excessive amount of data. In
addition, due to the novelty and ambiguity of many business problems, there is seldom a
proven rational model to derive the best decision (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).
Therefore, and given the overwhelming amount of available information and the limited
capacity of the human brain to process that information (Simon, 1992), managers tend to
rely on their intuition when making a decision (e.g. Agor, 1986; Burke & Miller, 1999;
Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014).
Individuals have two distinct cognitive systems for processing information and
making decisions; namely, intuition and analysis (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). Intuition is
an emotionally charged, nonconscious, automatic, and rapid cognitive process (Dane &
Pratt, 2007; Epstein, 2010; Hammond, 2010). Analysis, on the other hand, is conscious,
rational, logical, and is a comparatively slower cognitive process than intuition (Epstein,
1994; Epstein, 2010; Hammond, 2010). Of the two systems, intuition is thought to result
in better decisions in environments where there is greater uncertainty, complexity, time
pressure, insufficient data, and multiple solution possibilities (Agor, 1986; Baldacchino,
Ucbasaran, Cabantous, & Lockett, 2015; Burke & Miller, 1999).
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One environment that would seem to fit the aforementioned set of characteristics
is employee selection. However, research in this area often discourages the use of
intuition (Highhouse, 2008b; Highhouse & Kostek, 2013; Kausel, Culbertson, & Madrid,
2016), with scholars pointing to the biases of the intuitive process (e.g., the tendency to
gravitate towards candidates who are similar to oneself). For this reason, these scholars
argue that objective forms of assessment, such as cognitive ability tests, provide a more
accurate evaluation of a candidate.
It is somewhat surprising that intuition is labeled ineffective for hiring decisions
given its usefulness in decision-making environments that are similar to employee
selection (i.e., environments that have a high-level of uncertainty, complexity, time
pressure, insufficient data, and multiple solution possibilities). The current study argues
that one reason for this lack of academic support likely rests in the relatively scarce
number of empirical studies that have examined the role of intuition in recruitment (Miles
& Sadler-Smith, 2014). As a result, research has yet to thoroughly consider contextual
factors that impact an interviewer’s ability to make an accurate intuitive hiring decision.
Stated differently, a negative attitude towards intuitive hiring has been generalized to the
field at large without a thorough evaluation of the conditions in which intuition may, in
fact, be helpful. Therefore, the purpose of this paper was to explore the conditions that
impact the accuracy of an intuitive hiring decision. Accuracy, as defined in this paper, is
the ability of the interviewer to select the best candidate out of multiple viable options.
Relatedly, the research questions of interest in this paper are these: Can intuition lead to
accurate hiring decisions; and if so, under what conditions is this more likely to occur?
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One such condition assumed to be of importance in the current study is job
complexity. Accordingly, a complex job is a position that has many tacit elements that
leads to successful job performance (Campbell, 1984). Research has found objective and
analytical methods, such as cognitive ability tests and highly structured employment
interviews, to be effective when recruiting for low complexity jobs (e.g., Conway, Jako,
& Goodman, 1995; Huffcutt & Arthur, 1994; Wiesner & Cronshaw, 1988). However, as
job complexity increase, research finds that the effectiveness of analytical hiring methods
to decrease (Huffcutt, Weekley, Wiesner, Groot, & Jones, 2001; Levashina, Hartwell,
Morgeson, & Campion, 2014). As a consequence, intuition may be the more effective
way to make hiring decisions for complex jobs. In fact, considering that intuition has
been found to be more effective than analysis for complex tasks such as identifying
counterfeit products or a place to live (e.g., Dane et al., 2012; Dijksterhuis, 2004), this
paper argued that intuition is more accurate than analytical cognitive processing when
hiring for complex jobs.
Interviewer expertise (i.e., prior experience recruiting for similar positions) may
also impact the accuracy of an intuitive hiring decision. Prior research indicates that a
decision maker’s expertise increases the accuracy of intuitive decisions for complex tasks
such as those noted earlier as well as evaluating artwork or forecasting road safety (e.g.,
Chase & Simon, 1973a; Dane et al., 2012; Dijkstra, Pligt, & Kleef, 2013; Hammond,
Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987). In comparison, there is evidence that expertise does
not increase the accuracy of analytical decisions for those types of complex tasks (Dane
et al., 2012). Therefore, since expertise has a positive impact on intuition and not on
analysis, it is expected that when expert interviewers use intuition, they will be more
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accurate than when they use analysis. Furthermore, compared to non-expert interviewers
(i.e., those who does not have prior recruiting experience), this paper predicted that
expert interviewers will make more accurate hiring decisions.
In addition to job complexity and interviewer expertise, another important factor
that may affect the accuracy of intuition is the interviewer’s cognitive style. Cognitive
style refers to an individual’s inherent tendency to use either an analytical or an intuitive
style of information processing and decision-making (Brigham, De Castro, & Shepherd,
2007). In employee selection, cognitive style of interviewers has been found to impact
the preference for intuitive or analytical hiring methods (Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014).
Moreover, a mismatch between an individual’s cognitive style and the actual decisionmaking approach used to solve a problem is argued to have a detrimental effect
(Hodgkinson & Clark, 2007). Drawing from this research and other studies discussed in
the literature review, the current study expected that interviewers whose cognitive style
match the employee selection method (i.e., intuitive versus analytical) will be more
accurate than those whose cognitive style does not match the employee selection method.
Another shortcoming of existing intuition research is that it tends to focus on
conditions that are conducive to intuitive decision-making, with no attention and limited
understanding of common organizational factors that could disrupt an expert’s ability to
make an accurate intuitive decision. One such factor is procedural accountability.
Procedural accountability is the extent to which an individual is held accountable for the
procedure used in making a decision (Pitesa & Thau, 2013; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates,
1996). Thus, the next research question this paper explores is: how does procedural
accountability impact the accuracy of an expert’s intuitive judgment?

5

Based on the extant research on accountability, when individuals are required to
account for their decisions, research suggests that they are then inclined to use a more
deliberate cognitive information processing strategy (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock,
1983). Research has, in fact, found support for a relationship between procedural
accountability and analytical thinking (e.g., Doney & Armstrong, 1996). Analytical
thinking, in turn, may disrupt the intuitive process (Baumeister, 1984; Wilson &
Schooler, 1991). This disruption of the intuitive process can negatively affect decision
quality when the decision maker is an expert (e.g., Beilock, Bertenthal, McCoy, & Carr,
2004; Beilock, Carr, McMahon, & Starkes, 2002; Gray, 2004; Melcher & Schooler,
2004; Wimmers, Schmidt, Verkoeijen, & Van De Wiel, 2005). Therefore, when
recruiting for complex jobs, the current study predicted that the accuracy of expert
interviewers’ intuitive decisions will be lower when they are held accountable for the
hiring procedure.
In summary, this paper assessed the impact of interviewer expertise, cognitive
style, and procedural accountability on the accuracy of intuitive hiring decisions when
recruiting for complex jobs. This assessment occurred via a two-part experimental study
that assigned participants to intuition, analysis, and procedural accountability conditions.
Participants included an expert and non-expert sample of interviewers. In each part of the
study, participants performed the task of employee selection for a complex job.
Participants assumed the role of an interviewer, reviewed recordings of 10 pairs of
candidate interviews, and for each pair, decided which one of the two candidate
responses was better. The accuracy of hiring decisions was measured by calculating the
number of times the participants’ selected the best candidate response.
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This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, by identifying
conditions in which intuition can lead to accurate hiring decisions, the paper challenges
the existing notion among scholars that intuition is always less accurate than decisions
derived through more objective methods such as cognitive ability tests (e.g., Highhouse,
2008b; Highhouse & Kostek, 2013). As proposed by Evans (2010), we need to identify
when it is appropriate to rely on intuition and when it is not. Second, by testing whether
the findings of human cognitive processing (i.e., that intuition can be effective when the
decision maker has domain expertise and when the task is complex) holds true in an
employee selection context, this study extends the research on intuition. Third, since we
have a limited understanding of factors that could disrupt expert intuition in an
organizational setting, by empirically investigating the impact of procedural
accountability on expert intuition, this study attempted to narrow that gap while, at the
same time, advancing our knowledge of the role of accountability.
From a practitioner perspective, it will be extremely helpful to identify the
circumstances in which an expert interviewer should be allowed some leeway to use their
intuitive judgment in employee selection. This would be especially important for
complex jobs as these positions may have a significant influence on firm performance.
Therefore, the study makes a contribution to employee selection by enabling practitioners
to identify conditions in which it may be acceptable to allow an interviewer to use their
expert intuition over and above analytical selection methods.
Finally, by empirically examining the role of intuition in employee selection, this
study expands our knowledge of when intuition can be useful in a real-world,
organizational decision-making environment. The study underscores the importance of
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contextual factors in determining the effectiveness of intuition in managerial decisionmaking. By doing so, it lays the foundation for future research to further explore such
organizational factors that may impact intuition.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Intuition
Intuition is an emotionally charged, nonconscious, automatic, and rapid cognitive
process (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Epstein, 2010; Hammond 2010). The concept of intuition
has intrigued management and psychology scholars for decades. Chester Barnard (1938),
one of the first management scholars to emphasize the role of intuition in managerial
decision-making, identified intuition as a rapid, non-logical, and complex decisionmaking process. Intuition occurs outside of consciousness and therefore, cannot be
expressed using words (Barnard, 1938) or understood through conscious evaluation
(Jung, 1921). Intuition is particularly useful when a solution is seemingly impossible
through logical reasoning. In such a situation, intuition unconsciously and automatically
works towards finding a resolution (Jung, 1921).
Expanding on the role of intuition in decision-making, Herbert Simon (1957)
concluded that due to the overwhelming amount of available information in real-world
situations and the limited capacity of the human brain to process that information,
individuals tend to rely on intuition. He called this phenomenon bounded rationality. The
underlying assumption of bounded rationality is that because of information processing
deficiencies of the mind, there are limits on the ability of human beings to make optimal,
or even satisfactory, decisions in complex environments (Simon, 1992).
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Heuristics-and-Biases versus Naturalistic Decision-making
Based on Simon’s (1957) argument, intuition is a default method to make
decisions in complex decision-making environments. What Simon did not elaborate on,
however, was the effectiveness of this form of decision-making. Insights into this topic
can be found in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1973; 1983) seminal work on heuristics and
biases, which portrays intuition as flawed since intuitive judgments violate the statistical
rules of prediction. Heuristics-and-biases are the decision rules, mental mechanisms, and
subjective opinions used by individuals when making decisions (Busenitz & Barney,
1997). Based on their influential research, the causes for the deficiencies of intuition are
now attributed to one of three forms of heuristics: (1) representativeness – similarities
with prior situations; (2) availability –what comes easily to mind; and (3) anchoring –
what comes to mind first (Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2012).
Diverging from the heuristics-and-biases view and offering a more positive view
of intuition, the naturalistic-decision-making-framework emerged in the late 1980s
(Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001). The naturalistic-decision-making view
highlights the usefulness of intuition by focusing on the role of expert intuition (Klein,
Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986; Klein, Calderwood, & Macgregor, 1989; Klein,
1993). According to this view, in complex real-world settings (see Table 1 for
characteristics), analytical techniques are not always feasible or effective. For instance, it
is difficult to account for ambiguity, uncertainty, and missing data when applying
analytical methods (Klein & Klinger, 1991). In these types of settings, due to extensive
experience in the decision-making domain, an expert is instead able to quickly recognize
the correct course of action without much deliberation (Klein et al., 1988).
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Advocates of the heuristics-and-biases approach accept the existence of skill and
experience but focus on the errors of intuitive judgment (Kahneman & Klein, 2009).
Heuristics-and-biases researchers believe that the source of intuition is merely heuristic
[i.e., use of cognitive shortcuts without effort or analytical reasoning (Epstein, 2010)] and
does not draw from skill or experience (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). In contrast,
proponents of the naturalistic-decision-making view understand that individuals make
mistakes but focus on the extraordinary outcomes attained through the successful
intuitive decisions made by experts. Both groups agree that intuitive judgments originate
in the unconscious and are automatic and effortless. However, the naturalistic-decisionmaking researchers believe that effective intuitive judgments are derived from an
individual’s skill and experience in the decision-making domain.
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Intuition versus Guessing, Instinct, and Insight
A significant shortcoming of the earlier research on intuition is the lack of a clear
definition of what intuition is (Dane & Pratt, 2007). More recently, scholars have
attempted to clarify intuition by differentiating it from similar constructs such as
guessing, instinct, and insight. The only similarity between intuition and guessing is its
speed. Other than speed, guessing is vastly different from intuition, as it does not involve
the nonconscious utilization of complex mental models. In addition, guessing lacks the
inherent conviction that is evident in an intuitive decision (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Instincts
refer to innate reflex actions that are biologically instigated rather than derived through
nonconscious cognitive information processing (e.g., Hodgkinson, Sadler-Smith, Burke,
Claxton, & Sparrow, 2009). In contrast, insights are an unexpected solution to a problem
that springs to mind typically after a lengthy incubation period (Hodgkinson et al.,
2009a). Therefore, unlike intuition, which is a rapid and nonconscious process, insights
typically follow deliberate, analytical thinking (Dane & Pratt, 2007). In fact, intuition can
precede insight by way of a feeling of knowing that guides the individual towards the
ultimate decision (Hodgkinson et al., 2009a).
Types of Intuition
Scholars have also attempted to identify different facets of intuition (e.g., Dane &
Pratt, 2009; Sadler-Smith & Burke-Smalley, 2015). The prevalent types include: (1)
expert intuition (Baylor, 2001) (2) social intuition (Ambady, 2010), (3) moral intuition
(Sonenshein, 2007), and (4) creative intuition (Eling, Griffin, & Langerak, 2014). Expert
intuition refers to an intuitive decision based on an individual’s expertise in that
particular domain. This type is also called “problem-solving intuition” or “intuitive
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expertise” (Sadler-Smith & Burke-Smalley, 2015). The premise of expert intuition is that
individuals who have a tremendous amount of expertise in a specific domain, given a
problem within the same domain, are able to automatically identify complex patterns and
provide quick, effortless, and accurate responses. However, expert intuition is domain
specific. An expert in one domain may not be able to make an accurate intuitive decision
in a vastly different domain (Dane & Pratt, 2007).
Social intuition, also referred to as “mind-reading”, enables individuals to quickly
and automatically evaluate and identify another person’s motivations and intentions. This
is done through the nonconscious processing of verbal and non-verbal cues. Social
intuitions are judgments and may not necessarily be accurate. In addition, social intuition
can be significantly influenced by individual factors such as fears, biases, prejudices, and
wishful thinking (Sadler-Smith & Burke-Smalley, 2015). Social intuition is particularly
relevant to situations that involve interpersonal interactions such as employee selection
(Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014).
Moral intuition is a fast, non-deliberate, and emotionally charged cognitive
process (Weaver, Reynolds, & Brown, 2014) that is associated with how individuals react
to ethical dilemmas. Individuals make moral decisions intuitively (i.e., quickly and
automatically) and then search for evidence to rationalize their initial reaction
(Gigerenzer, 2008; Sadler-Smith & Burke-Smalley, 2015). Finally, creative intuition is a
non-rational process and involves the synthesizing of disparate elements to form a novel
creation (Dane & Pratt, 2009). Individuals may be able to improve creativity through the
re-creation of those environments where they have experienced intuition (Burke &
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Miller, 1999). Furthermore, intuition always precedes creativity, invention, and
innovation (Sadler-Smith & Burke-Smalley, 2015).
Intuition is a “Fuzzy Construct”
As discussed in the foregoing section, research from management and psychology
is not short of attempts to explain what intuition is and how it impacts the human
decision-making process. In fact, more recently the study of intuition has gained
considerable interest in both industry and academia. Even though the extant literature
relating to the topic has broadened our knowledge of this phenomenon called intuition, it
has not necessarily deepened and clarified our understanding of what intuition is, how it
works, and how it can be used more effectively. There is still a certain amount of
confusion surrounding the concept of intuition, which has hindered the advancement of
the topic.
One of the main causes for the confusion surrounding intuition is the diverse
definitions of what intuition is (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Hammond et al., 1987). As noted by
Epstein (2010), not only do scholars disagree about what intuition is, they sometimes
even contradict their own arguments. As a result, intuition is viewed as a fuzzy construct
with limited scientific value as the definitions of intuition do not clearly express the
operation of intuition (Epstein, 2010). The confusion is not because most scholars have
completely opposing views of what intuition is. Instead, the problem is that the different
definitions tend to focus on different aspects of intuition. Therefore, there is a fragmented
notion about what intuition really means.
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In spite of the diverse definitions of intuition, across the literature, four underlying
characteristics emerge as central tenets of the intuitive process: (1) intuition operates
beyond consciousness (i.e., it is a nonconscious process), (2) it involves making holistic
associations, (3) it is fast, and (4) it is affectively charged (i.e., tied to emotion) (Dane &
Pratt, 2007). The following paragraphs elaborate on each of the four characteristics and
culminate with a definition of intuition.
Intuition is a nonconscious process. Shapiro and Spence (1997) defined intuition
as “a nonconscious, holistic processing mode in which judgments are made with no
awareness of the rules of knowledge used for inference and which can feel right, despite
one’s inability to articulate the reason” (p. 64). Unlike a rational decision-making process
where the decision maker consciously and deliberately follows a logical pattern to derive
a solution (Hogarth, 2002); intuition is a nonconscious and a non-logical cognitive
process. Thus, the intuitive process “involves a sense of knowing without knowing how
one knows” (Epstein, 2010 p. 296). The decision maker knows the decision but is unable
to articulate how the decision was derived.
Intuition makes holistic associations. Holistic association is a process where a
specific situation triggers a nonconscious association of thoughts and patterns that are
stored in an individual’s memory. This association of information is the result of past
experiences that are held in mental maps or schemas within the individual’s brain
(Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004). Simon (1992) eloquently captures this holistic cognitive
process with his definition of intuition, which stated, “the situation has provided a cue:
This cue has given the expert access to information stored in memory, and the
information provides the answer.” (p. 155).
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Intuition is fast. The speed of an intuitive response, a characteristic that was even
observed by the pioneering management scholars of intuition (e.g., Barnard, 1938), is a
facet of intuition that consistently appears in most scholarly work relating to intuition
(e.g., Khatri & Ng, 2000; Hammond et al., 1987). For instance, Kahneman (2003)
defined intuition as “thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly and without
much reflection” (p. 697). Practitioners view this aspect of intuition as a benefit as it
leads to quicker decisions (Burke & Miller, 1999). Most scholars agree that, compared to
analytical decision-making, intuition is a speedy process (Dane & Pratt, 2007).
Intuition is affectively charged. Intuition is firmly interwoven with the decision
maker’s emotion (Burke & Miller, 1999; Shapiro & Spence, 1997). As such, emotion is a
central component in intuitive decision-making. Unlike rational analysis, which is often
associated with the “head”, intuition is considered to be intrinsically connected to the
“heart” (i.e., emotion) (Dane & Pratt, 2007) which has prompted some scholars to call
intuition as “gut feelings” and “gut instincts” (e.g., Shapiro & Spence, 1997). Field
research findings support the interplay between intuition and emotion. For example, forty
percent of the professionals interviewed by Burke and Miller (1999) stated that intuition
is based on an individual’s feelings or emotions.
Combining the aforementioned characteristics of intuition (i.e., nonconscious,
holistic, rapid, and affectively charged), Dane and Pratt (2007) defined intuition as
“affectively charged judgments that arise through rapid, nonconscious, and holistic
associations” (p. 40). Since this definition aptly captures the key attributes of intuition in
a concise manner, it is adopted in the present study.
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Unitary versus Dual Process View of Intuition
As we further explore the concept of intuition, it is important to distinguish
between the two prevailing views on cognitive information processing. One set of
scholars adopt a unitary view by arguing that intuition and analysis are opposite ends of a
single continuum (e.g., Allinson & Hayes, 1996; Baylor, 1997; Hammond et al., 1987;
Simon, 1992). On one end of the spectrum is pure intuition where the decision is
unjustifiable, inexpressible, and fast. On the other end is pure analysis where the decision
is justifiable, expressible, and slow. Typically, a human judgment would fall somewhere
along the continuum depending on the inherent cognitive decision style of the individual
(i.e., intuitive versus analytic) as well as the properties of the task (e.g., prior experience
with the same or similar task) (Hammond, 2010).
Another set of scholars embrace a dual-process view of information processing
(e.g., Epstein et al., 1996; Evans, 2010; Hodgkinson, Sadler-Smith, Sinclair, &
Ashkanasy, 2009). This view is grounded in cognitive-experiential self-theory (Epstein,
1994); a theory that describes people as having two information processing systems, an
experiential system [also referred to as system 1 (Kahneman, 2003), X system (Healey,
Vouri, & Hodgkinson, 2015), and type 1 process (Evans, 2010)] and a rational system
[also referred to as system 2 (Kahneman, 2003), C system (Healey et al., 2015), and type
2 process (Evans, 2010)]. The experiential system, which is driven by emotion, is
automatic and is responsible for non-analytical processes such as intuition (Epstein,
2010). In contrast, the rational system is analytical and operates according to an
individual’s understanding of logical inference (Epstein, 1994).
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In contrast to the unitary view, according to the dual process view, intuition and
analysis are distinct, independent constructs (Evans, 2010) that interact with each other
both sequentially (i.e., one system followed by the other) and simultaneously (i.e., both
systems competing at the same time) (Epstein, 2010). The relative dominance of one
system is influenced by individual differences in cognitive style as well as situational
factors such as perceived task difficulty (Epstein, 2010). Furthermore, as the two systems
are independent, an individual may be high or low in one or both constructs (Pretz, 2008).
The distinction between the unitary and dual process views is important as it
determines not only how a researcher views the functioning of the cognitive process but
also impacts the measurement of the construct as the measuring instruments are different
based on the view. Although the debate continues on which one of the two views best
represent the cognitive process, the dual process view has gained prominence in
management research relating to cognitive information processing (e.g., Evans, 2010;
Hodgkinson & Clark, 2007). Furthermore, as noted by Sadler-Smith and Burke-Smalley
(2015), the dual process view provides a coherent theoretical framework that enables
researchers to gain further insight into the workings of the mind. Therefore, in this paper,
the human cognitive process is viewed through the dual process perspective.
Necessary Conditions for Effective Intuitive Decision-making
The preceding section discussed the concept and operation of intuition. The focus
of this section is to examine the antecedents for effective intuitive decision-making.
Based on extant literature relating to the topic, three conditions appear to impact the
effectiveness of intuitive decision-making: (1) domain expertise, (2) task characteristics,
and (3) task environment.
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Domain Expertise
Dane and Pratt (2007) argued that the effectiveness of an intuitive decision
depends on the nature of the mental schemas in the mind of the individual. These
schemas can either be (1) simple heuristics with minimal domain-relevant knowledge, or
(2) complex cognitive maps with a high level of domain-specific information. The
heuristic framework is domain independent and therefore lacks the domain sensitivity
that is required to make an effective intuitive decision. Furthermore, as the simplicity of
the heuristic schemas lack the capacity to process the complex information presented in a
problem, using such a framework to make an intuitive decision can lead to an erroneous
decision (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Thus, heuristics is a flawed and inconsistent form of
judgment (Kahneman & Klein, 2009).
However, an individual may also possess highly complex, domain-relevant
mental schemas (Chase & Simon, 1973b; Dane & Pratt, 2007). These mental schemas are
the result of extensive domain experience and are commonly referred to as ‘expert
intuition’ (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Domain expertise has been found to lead to effective
intuitive decisions (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973a; Dane et al., 2012; Dijkstra et al., 2013;
Hammond et al., 1987). However, the effectiveness of an expert’s intuitive judgment is
restricted to their domain of expertise (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Therefore, an individual who
is an expert in one domain may not be able to make an effective intuitive decision in a
completely different domain.
The origins of the school of thought supporting expert intuition can be traced back
to the work of Chase and Simon (1973a; 1973b). Studying characteristics of master chess
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players, Chase and Simon (1973b) found that chess grandmasters had the remarkable
ability to rapidly process complex chess configurations. The authors estimated that chess
masters are able to recognize 50,000 to 100,000 patterns and immediately identify the
best move without much deliberation. This extraordinary ability can be credited to the
well-developed, complex mental schemas that are a result of extensive practice and study
of chess.
In a separate experimental study, Chase and Simon (1973a) found that, compared
to novice chess players, master chess players are able to extract more information from a
brief exposure to a chess position. Hence, they were better able to re-construct those
positions than novice chess players. The authors concluded that the superior performance
of the master chess players is due to their ability to encode the chess positions to
perceptual chunks, each of which contains familiar configurations of chess pieces.
Interestingly, the master’s ability to re-construct the chess positions decreased when the
chess pieces were randomly placed on the board rather than in true chess positions.
Therefore, it is evident that the master’s superior performance was due to the mental
models developed through prior experience and not due to greater memory capacity.
In a more recent study, Dane et al. (2012) conducted two experiments to
investigate the relationship between domain expertise and the effectiveness of an intuitive
decision. Some participants were assigned to an intuitive condition while others were
assigned to an analytical condition. Both groups were exposed to tasks (i.e., assessing the
difficulty of a basketball shot and authenticating designer handbags) that is considered to
be conducive to intuitive decision-making (a more elaborate discussion about task
characteristics that are conducive to intuitive decision-making will follow in a subsequent
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section). In both studies, it was found that the effectiveness of intuition, relative to
analysis, is strengthened when the decision maker has high domain expertise, thus
supporting the argument that expert intuition can lead to effective decision-making.
Task Characteristics
The characteristics of the task can have a significant impact on the effectiveness
of using an intuitive versus an analytical decision-making approach. When dealing with
problems that are conducive to analytical solutions, analytical decision-making may be
best. But, when dealing with problems that are complex and ambiguous, intuitive
decision-making may well be a better option (Denhardt & Dugan, 1978; Friedman,
Howell, & Jensen, 1985; Hammond et al., 1987; Hogarth, 2002). Tasks that are
conducive to analytical solutions, also referred to as intellective tasks (Dane & Pratt,
2009), are highly decomposable (Hammond et al., 1987) and can be solved using reason
or mathematical formulas. In such decomposable tasks, an individual is able to
analytically solve the problem and articulate or illustrate the steps taken to derive the
solution. Given these characteristics, intuition may not be effective for decomposable
tasks (Dane et al., 2012).
In contrast, intuition has been found to be effective for complex tasks that are not
as easily decomposed (e.g., Dane et al., 2012; Dijksterhuis, 2004). Unlike decomposable
tasks, these types of tasks are abstract and are difficult to solve using math and logical
inference. As a result, for complex and ambiguous tasks, also referred to as nondecomposable tasks (Dane et al., 2012) and judgmental tasks (Hammond et al., 1987), it
is difficult to derive a solution using a purely analytical process. Therefore, for complex
tasks, intuition may be more effective as the intuitive process allows the individual to
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make holistic judgments by considering the different aspects of the task that cannot be
combined using an analytical method. As noted by Hodgkinson et al. (2009a), intuition is
generally preferred by managers for unstructured tasks where there is no clear objective
method to solve the problem.
Through five experimental studies, Dijksterhuis (2004) investigated the role of
conscious (i.e., analytical reasoning) and unconscious thought (i.e., intuitive reasoning) in
solving complex problems. Due to the low processing capacity of consciousness, for
complex problems, which in this study was either selecting an apartment or selecting a
roommate, the author hypothesized intuitive processing would be more effective than
analytical processing. The results supported the hypothesis. The ineffectiveness of
analytical processing may be due to the inability of the conscious mind to absorb and
synthesize a large amount of information since individuals who use analytical processing
pay too much attention to a limited number of attributes of the problem (Dijksterhuis,
2004). On the other hand, the effectiveness of intuition to solve complex problems may
be due to the remarkable ability of the human mind to unconsciously, automatically, and
rapidly process a large number of disparate pieces of information.
When discussing the impact of task complexity on the effectiveness of intuitive
versus analytical decision-making, it is important to note the difference between task
complexity and task difficulty. Complex tasks are difficult. However, certain tasks might
be difficult, but may not necessarily be complex. The key difference is that complex
tasks, in addition to being difficult, are typically ill-structured and ambiguous (Campbell,
1988). For example, solving an advanced mathematical problem might be difficult.
However, it is not ambiguous since the math problem can be accurately solved if one
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follows the correct mathematical procedure. In contrast, estimating future stock prices is
a complex task due to the ambiguity and the complexity of the stock market.
Task Environment
Decision-making context influences the use and effectiveness of intuition
(Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005). In dynamic and rapidly changing environments, when
there are limited time and information to make a decision, and when there are conditions
of ambiguity and uncertainty, individuals often have to rely on intuitive judgment
(Denhardt & Dugan, 1978). According to Agor (1986), intuition may be useful under
seven conditions; when there is a high level of uncertainty, there is no precedent to base
the solution, variables are volatile, hard data is limited or does not provide clear direction,
analytical data is insufficient, there is more than one reasonable solution, and time
pressure is high. Supporting this argument, Burke and Miller (1999) noted five of their
own conditions for when intuition may be helpful; when situations do not have
predetermined guidelines, objective data are inaccurate, decisions need to be made
quickly or unexpectedly, there is a high level of uncertainty, and clear cues are
unavailable. When clear hard data are not available, one-way of dealing with the
uncertainty is to rely on intuition (Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004).
Further insight into the impact of task environment on the effectiveness of
intuition can be gleaned from the entrepreneurship literature. The cognitive style of the
entrepreneur plays a pivotal role in the entrepreneurship process (Baldacchino,
Ucbasaran, Cabantous, & Lockett, 2015). Compared to individuals with a preference for
an analytical decision-making style, studies have found that entrepreneurs with a
preference for an intuitive cognitive style are better suited for an environment where
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there is greater level of uncertainty such as an entrepreneurial venture (Baldacchino et al.,
2015; Kickul, Gundry, Barbosa, & Whitcanack, 2009). This difference is because, in an
uncertain environment, there is often no explicit rational choice or logical step-by-step
solution available. Therefore, individuals cannot rely on analytical methods alone to
derive a solution and intuition may be the only viable way to make a decision. As such,
some scholars recognize intuition as the core of entrepreneurial action (Dutta & Crossan,
2005).
As described above, even though there is some evidence that intuition can be
effective under certain conditions (i.e., when the decision maker has domain expertise,
when the task is complex, and when the task environment has certain characteristics that
are conducive to intuition decision-making), there is still a scarcity of empirical research
that explore the effect of intuition in complex organizational settings. Employee selection
is one of those settings. Given the significance of employee selection to the success of an
organization, it is important to identify if intuition can be useful in making successful
hiring decisions.
Employee selection is a complex process that typically involves a high level of
uncertainty, time pressure, insufficient data, and more than one reasonable solution, all of
which are characteristics of an environment that may be conducive to intuitive decisionmaking (Agor, 1986; Burke & Miller, 1999). However, there is little applied research that
examines the effect of intuition in employee selection (Highhouse & Kostek, 2013; Miles
& Sadler-Smith, 2014). The following section reviews this literature.
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Intuitive versus Analytical Approaches in Employee Selection
Both intuitive and analytical selection methods are used in employee selection.
Intuitive hiring refers to the subjective, informal methods in which an interviewer makes
a hiring decision typically derived through a traditional unstructured interview. In
contrast, analytical hiring methods rely on objective techniques and decision aids such as
structured interviews, standardized tests, cognitive ability tests, and personality tests.
Existing research on recruitment has found analytical forms of employee selection to be
more reliable and valid than unstructured interviews (Conway et al., 1995; Huffcutt &
Arthur, 1994; Levashina et al., 2014; Wiesner & Cronshaw, 1988). Therefore, scholars
argue that analytical employee selection methods are more effective than intuitive
methods (Highhouse, 2008b; Highhouse & Kostek, 2013; Levashina et al., 2014).
The higher validity of analytical hiring methods, compared to intuitive methods,
is credited to the objectivity of the analytical techniques as well as the insusceptibility of
those techniques to rater biases. Highhouse (2008b) argued that intuitive hiring methods
make the errors in selection ambiguous (e.g., it is difficult to judge rater biases when
there are no objective tools to compare candidates). Analytical approaches, on the other
hand, make those errors visible and detectable (e.g., rater biases may be more detectable
when standardized procedures, such as cognitive ability tests, allow objective comparison
of the candidates).
In a meta-analytic review, Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, and Nelson (2000) found
that, with regard to prediction of human behavior (e.g., academic performance, job
success, criminal behavior), mechanical methods of combining data such as using a
computer program to emulate expert judgment (i.e., an analytical method) are as good as
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or better than subjective (i.e., intuitive) judgments. Therefore, since the goal of a job
interview is to accurately predict human behavior, these findings provide further support
for the use of analytical over intuitive hiring methods. However, it should be noted that
only two out of 136 studies included in the analysis were in an employee selection
context and involved predicting job success. As such, it is difficult to generalize the
findings to employee selection due to the small sample size.
In spite of the academic arguments supporting the use of analytical hiring
methods, most practitioners rely on intuition when making hiring decisions (Colarelli &
Thompson, 2008; Diab et al., 2011; Highhouse & Kostek, 2013). Using in-depth
interviews with hiring managers, Miles and Sadler-Smith (2014) attempted to understand
why managers use intuition over analysis when making employee selection decisions.
The authors found that some of the predominant reasons included personal preference,
resource constraints, and recognition of the limitations of more structured approaches.
Participants considered intuition to be derived from experience and consequently, their
confidence in making an intuitive hiring decision increased with experience. Nonetheless,
the participants also recognized the limitations of intuition, such as biased judgment
based on stereotypes, and acknowledged that intuition may be more effective when
combined with analytical methods (Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014).
As further evidence of practitioner’s use of intuition over analysis, out of 166 line
managers interviewed in a study conducted by Nowicki and Rosse (2002), most believed
that their past successful hires were due to intuition and luck. Consequently, the authors
concluded that although there is research in academia that links analytical recruiting
practices to post-hire outcomes, there is very little interest among practitioners. To
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illustrate, the authors provide data from the American Management Association (1997)
that shows only 28 percent of employers used a cognitive ability test and only 19 percent
used personality tests.
There are some academic arguments that support the practitioner’s preference for
intuition over analysis in employee selection. Arguments supporting the use of intuition
in employee selection generally fall under two categories: holism and thin slices.
Holism. Holism is a school of thought founded on the premise that assessment of
future success requires considering the whole person, not just selective facets such as
personality or cognitive ability (Highhouse & Kostek, 2013; Langhammer, 2013). Those
with a holistic view consider analytical techniques to be secondary to expert judgment.
Those who advocate holism believe that expert intuition is the only way to understand
how different attributes interact to create a complex whole (Highhouse & Kostek, 2013).
Moreover, expert intuition is not only useful to collect information but also to
appropriately combine the various forms of data to make a holistic decision (Highhouse
& Kostek, 2013). From a practitioner perspective, a holistic approach to integrating the
interview process data has been found to be more favorable than analytical methods
(Diab et al., 2011). However, the academic arguments supporting holism are mostly
conceptual and lack empirical support (Highhouse & Kostek, 2013).
Thin slices. Thin slice research typically involves getting untrained raters to
evaluate individuals by viewing short video recordings of their nonverbal behavior
(Eisenkraft, 2013; Murphy et al., 2015). These video recordings are typically only a few
seconds in length. Research has found that judgments based on thin slices can accurately
predict various outcomes (Ambady, Krabbenhoft, & Hogan 2006; Ambady, Koo,
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Rosenthal, & Winograd, 2002a; Ambady, LaPlante, Nguyen, Rosenthal, Chaumeton, &
Levinson, 2002b; Ambady & Rosenthal, 1993) including employee job performance
(Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992).
Eisenkraft (2013) argued that the collective intuitive judgments based on thin
slices are stronger than a single interviewers' intuitive judgment. Thus, Eisenkraft (2013)
concluded that an intuition based first impression will typically not be a valid predictor of
job performance unless the intuitive judgments of multiple interviewers are combined.
Miles and Sadler-Smith (2014), who conducted a qualitative study of hiring managers,
concur by stating that collecting interview judgments of multiple interviewers will be
more effective and will help to negate individual biases. In contrast, Huffcutt and Woehr
(1999) who conducted a meta-analytic review of interview studies found that a panel of
interviewers does not increase validity, and may, in fact, have a detrimental effect.
To summarize, even though there are some scholarly arguments supporting the
use of intuition in recruitment, the general consensus among academics is that analytical
forms of employee selection are superior to intuition (Highhouse, 2008b; Highhouse &
Kostek, 2013; Levashina et al., 2014). Practitioners, however, still largely rely on
intuition to make hiring decisions (Diab et al., 2011). From an academic perspective, is it
possible that scholars were too quick to dismiss the potential use of intuition in employee
selection without fully understanding the conditions in which intuition may, in fact, be
helpful? Thus far, scholars have not thoroughly examined contextual factors that could
impact the effectiveness of intuition in employee selection.
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Impact of Context on the Effectiveness of Intuition
When studying why hiring managers tend to favor intuition over analysis, context
is a critical factor to consider (Colarelli & Thompson, 2008). Perceived effectiveness of
intuitive hiring decisions can vary based on context (Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014).
Klimoski and Jones (2008) suggested that the needs of the decision maker are often the
result of context. Managers may rely on intuition, as opposed to analytical selection
methods, due to the inability to sustain a complex selection program as well as the
perceived benefits of using such a program. The level of accountability of the decision
maker to other stakeholders in the organization may also have an impact on the decisionmaking approach. Furthermore, financial considerations may influence the decision
maker to intuitively select a candidate rather than investing in an elaborate employee
selection program (Klimoski & Jones, 2008).
Miles and Sadler-Smith (2014) found that intuition was perceived to be effective
in situations where hard data was either not available or inadequate to make a hiring
decision. In these circumstances, intuition allowed the interviewer to assess and obtain an
overall impression of the candidate. On the other hand, intuition was perceived to be less
effective when assessments were necessary to test an individual’s level of competence,
when it caused stereotyping, and when it was used in an unstructured way. The authors
noted that intuition becomes particularly important if a pool of candidates is identified as
equally competent through analytical methods. In such a situation, an intuitive decision
based on face-to-face interviews might be the only way to distinguish between the
candidates (Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014).
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Therefore, context appears to have a significant impact on the use and
effectiveness of intuition in employee selection. The context could include task-related
factors such as task complexity. Recall that task complexity is an antecedent for effective
intuitive decision-making. Thus, in order to draw a comparison between intuition and
employee selection research, the following section discusses the extant research in
employee selection that focuses on the role of job complexity on the effectiveness of
intuitive decision-making.
Impact of Job Complexity on the Effectiveness of Intuition
Even though research, in general, has found analytical forms of employee
selection to outperform intuitive judgments (Conway et al., 1995; Huffcutt & Arthur,
1994; Levashina et al., 2014; Wiesner & Cronshaw, 1988), when it comes to complex
jobs, the findings are somewhat contradictory (Levashina et al., 2014). Complex jobs are
positions that have higher information processing demands (Hunter, Schmidt, &
Judiesch, 1990). For simple jobs, since there is a clear cause-effect relationship to job
performance, it is easier to specify evaluation standards (Dipboye, 1994). However, for
complex jobs, it is much more difficult to specify evaluation standards or to identify
factors that contribute towards good job performance (Chen, Tsai, & Hu, 2008). This is
because there is no clear connection between an individual’s skills, knowledge, and prior
experience to subsequent job performance. Thus, it is problematic to create standardized
selection metrics, such as standardized tests, for positions that are high in complexity
(Chen et al., 2008).
In intuition research, scholars have found that an intuitive decision-making style
is better suited for situations that are complex, uncertain, high in time pressure, have
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insufficient data, and when there is more than one reasonable option (e.g., Agor, 1986;
Burke & Miller, 1999). An employee selection environment typically consists of these
characteristics. This is especially true for complex positions where there is a high level of
uncertainty as there is no definite connection between a candidate’s qualifications and
future job performance (e.g., managerial positions). As such, intuition is a way to assess
candidates for positions where the antecedents for effective job performance are not
easily identifiable or measurable (Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014).
Highhouse and Kostek (2013) note that milder forms of holistic belief systems
(i.e. an intuitive approach) are held by organizational psychologists who conduct
assessments for managerial and executive level positions. Since these type of positions
can be categorized as complex jobs, Highhouse and Kostek’s (2013) statement supports
the argument that intuitive assessments may be useful for complex positions. As
Highhouse (2008b) noted, the support for holistic assessment for a high-level job is based
on the idea that the complex characteristics of a high-level job candidate can only be
assessed by an equally complex individual (i.e., an individual who understands the
idiosyncrasies of the position and the candidate, and is able to holistically combine the
available data to make an effective hiring decision).
Through a review of employment interview literature, Levashina et al. (2014)
note that there have been mixed findings regarding the validity of the structured interview
(i.e., an analytical technique) for high complexity jobs. The authors noted that, in most
studies, the validity of structured interviews decrease for high complexity jobs. These
findings further support the argument that analytical employee selection methods alone
may not be ideal for high-complexity jobs (Levashina et al., 2014).
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Huffcutt, Conway, Roth, and Klehe (2004), who conducted a meta-analysis to
determine the effects of job complexity on the validity of the structured interview, got a
slightly different result. Even though these authors found increased job complexity to
decrease the validity of the situational-interview, the validity of the patterned-behaviordescription-interview was not affected. However, although both of these interview types
are considered structured interviews, the patterned-behavior-description-interview can be
considered less structured as it does not always require standardization (Conway &
Peneno, 1999). For example, a patterned-behavior-description-interview allows asking
probing questions whereas the situational-interview does not. As such, compared to the
situational-interview, the patterned-behavior-description-interview provides an
opportunity for intuitive assessment. Therefore, the finding that the patterned-behaviordescription-interview is not affected by job complexity does not necessarily contradict
the notion that intuitive judgment might be effective for complex jobs.
Huffcutt et al. (2004) discussed two potential reasons for the moderating effect of
job complexity on the situational interview. First is the inadequacy of the scoring system.
Although the standard situational scoring system may work well for low to medium
complex jobs, for highly complex jobs, the scoring system may not be detailed enough to
capture the more complex answers provided by the applicants. Second, because a
complex job will have more complicated facets, it will be difficult to come up with
hypothetical situational questions that accurately measure the applicant’s ability to
perform complex tasks. Therefore, the quality of the situational questions may not be
sufficient to accurately assess a candidate for a complex job (Huffcutt et al., 2004).
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Overall, research findings seem to suggest that job complexity has an impact on
the effectiveness of the hiring method. As job complexity increases, the effectiveness of
analytical hiring methods decrease (Levashina et al., 2014) and the effectiveness of
intuitive hiring may increase. In addition to job complexity, since the decision maker’s
domain expertise has been found to increase the quality of intuitive judgment (e.g., Chase
& Simon, 1973a; Dane et al., 2012; Dijkstra et al., 2013; Hammond et al., 1987), the
following section focuses on the impact of the interviewer’s domain expertise on the
effectiveness of intuitive hiring decisions.
Impact of Domain Expertise on the Effectiveness of Intuition
Practitioners tend to believe that the ability to make good intuitive hiring
decisions increase with experience (Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014). Highhouse (2008b)
referred to this phenomenon as the ‘myth of expertise’ and concluded that different types
of rater bias limit the accuracy of intuitive judgments. Examples of such rater bias
include; anchoring (i.e., tendency to rely on the first piece of information to judge
subsequent data), halo bias (i.e., tendency to judge a candidate by the overall impression
and not accurately evaluate the individual on relevant dimensions), and similar-to-me
bias (i.e., tendency to gravitate towards candidates who are similar to oneself) (Dries,
2013). In addition, factors such as overconfidence, hindsight bias, personal political
objectives, and the desire to look like an expert may impact the intuitive judgment of an
interviewer (Highhouse, 2008a). Therefore, some academics argue that an interviewer’s
intuitive ability to accurately predict the job performance of an applicant does not
increase with experience (Highhouse, 2008b; Highhouse and Kostek, 2013).
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Those who support intuitive hiring methods view expert intuition as the only way
to identify how disparate elements interact to create a complex whole (Highhouse &
Kostek, 2013). For one, experts have the capacity to identify idiosyncrasies in a
candidate's profile. For another, compared to non-experts, experts are better able to
interpret configurations of traits (Highhouse, 2008b). As such, not only is expert intuition
important in collecting candidate information, it is also important to accurately combine
the data collected from different sources (Highhouse & Kostek, 2013). Dipboye (1994)
who compared the validity of the structured versus unstructured interview, observed that
since experts generally have more complex, reliable, and accessible knowledge structures
than non-experts, compared to non-experts, expert interviewers may be somewhat more
effective in making intuitive hiring decisions. However, the author concluded that even
an expert is unlikely to match the accuracy of analytical selection methods.
To summarize, although there are some arguments to the contrary, the general
consensus among scholars in employee selection is that expertise does not increase the
interviewer’s ability to make an effective intuitive hiring decision. In contrast, intuition
research has repeatedly found expertise to impact the effectiveness of intuition (e.g.,
Chase & Simon, 1973a; Dane et al., 2012; Dijkstra et al., 2013; Hammond et al., 1987).
The reason for the discrepancy might be the fact that employee selection research has not
thoroughly considered factors, such as job complexity, that could impact an expert
interviewer’s intuitive judgment.
In further exploring the impact of interviewer related factors on the effectiveness
of intuition, another aspect to consider is the decision maker’s cognitive style. The
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following section explains what cognitive style is and how it impacts decision-making,
especially in relation to employee selection.
Impact of Cognitive Style on Decision Quality
Cognitive style refers to an individual’s inherent tendency to use either an
analytical or intuitive style for information processing and decision-making (Brigham et
al., 2007). Based on the premise of dual-process theory, which views intuition and
analysis to be distinct, independent constructs (Evans, 2010), Hodgkinson and Clark
(2007) argue that individuals fall into one of four cognitive categories in terms of their
preference for intuitive or analytical information processing (see Figure 1).
Figure 1
Basic Typology of Contrasting Cognitive Strategies and Style

As depicted in Hodgkinson and Clark’s (2007) conceptual framework, individuals
in the detail conscious category are highly analytical and seldom rely on intuition. In
contrast, those who are big picture conscious are highly intuitive and tend to ignore the
details. The non-discerning are those who try to exert minimal cognitive resources either
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for analytical or intuitive information processing. However, individuals categorized as
cognitively versatile are high in both intuitive and analytical decision-making ability and
have the skill to switch between the two modes depending on the situation.
Cognitive style does not change over time (Brigham et al., 2007) and individuals
generally have a predisposition to either be more intuitive or analytical (Epstein, Pacini,
Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Norris & Epstein, 2011). Furthermore, cognitive style has
been found to have an impact on how individuals make decisions (e.g., Dutta &
Thornhill, 2008) as well as the outcomes of those decisions (e.g., Sadler-Smith, 2004).
An individual’s inherent cognitive style is not always the same as the actual decisionmaking approach employed by that individual to make a decision (Blume & Covin,
2011). The actual decision-making approach used to solve a problem is termed cognitive
strategy (Hodgkinson & Clarke, 2007). While cognitive style is the preference to use
either an intuitive or an analytical approach to information processing and decisionmaking, cognitive strategy is the actual use of either an intuitive or analytical style in a
given situation (Hodgkinson & Clarke, 2007). A mismatch between cognitive style and
cognitive strategy may result in a negative outcome. For example, Brigham et al. (2007)
found that, in highly structured work environments (i.e., an environment prone to
analytical decision-making), owner-managers who have an intuitive cognitive style were
less satisfied than those who have an analytical cognitive style.
In employee selection, research has found that the cognitive style of interviewers
impacts the preference for intuitive or analytical hiring methods (e.g., Miles & SadlerSmith, 2014). For example, interviewers who are analytical have a more favorable
perception towards the structured interview (Levashina et al., 2014). Conversely,
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managers who are inherently intuitive tend to use an intuitive style in employee selection
(Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014). Lodato, Highhouse, and Brooks (2011) found that
professionals who prefer intuition in employee selection are typically experiential
thinkers, are less experienced, are employed by a smaller firm, and do not have advanced
professional certification. Overall, based on extant findings, it is apparent that the
interviewer’s cognitive style has an impact on the preference to use either an intuitive or
analytical selection approach. Moreover, it appears that individuals are more inclined to
use their inherent cognitive style to make hiring decisions.
To summarize, factors such as job complexity, interviewer domain expertise, and
the interviewer’s cognitive style may impact the effectiveness of intuition in employee
selection. Since intuition has been found to be effective for domain experts when solving
complex problems, it is possible that intuitive hiring can be effective for expert
interviewers when recruiting for complex jobs. However, given conditions that may be
conducive to intuitive decision-making (i.e., complex tasks), we have little knowledge of
factors that could inhibit an expert’s intuitive judgment. One such potential factor is
decision accountability. The following section discusses the role of decision
accountability on expert intuition.
Role of Decision Accountability on Expert Intuition
Research on accountability has shown that, when individuals are required to
justify their decisions, under certain conditions, they use more complex information
processing strategies (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1983). As such, decision
accountability can prompt an individual to evaluate their cognitive processes in an
analytical manner. More specifically, procedural accountability, which is a sub-
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dimension of accountability, has been found to lead to a more extensive analysis of
information (e.g., Doney & Armstrong, 1996).
As described in Chapter 1, procedural accountability is the extent to which an
individual is held accountable to the quality of the procedure used in making a decision
(Pitesa & Thau, 2013; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996). Brtek and Motowidlo (2002), who
examined the effect of procedural and outcome accountability on interview validity,
found attentiveness to mediate the positive relationship between procedural
accountability and decision quality. Since attentiveness is a conscious, deliberate state of
mind, the findings of Brtek and Motowidlo (2002) support the notion that procedural
accountability may prompt analytical cognitive processing.
Analytical cognitive processing, in turn, may disrupt the effectiveness of intuition
(Baumeister, 1984; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). Through multiple experiments, Wilson
and Schooler (1991) found that introspection, a form of analytical reasoning, has a
detrimental effect on decision quality. The authors concluded that too much thinking
about an issue causes individuals to focus on non-optimal criteria, thereby resulting in a
non-optimal decision. Similarly, metacognition (i.e., controlled thought process where
one reflects on one’s actions) may have an unfavorable effect on intuition as the
metacognitive process interrupts intuitive thinking (Baylor, 1997; Baylor, 2001).
The negative effect of analytical cognitive processing on intuition may be
amplified in conditions that are conducive to intuitive decision-making (i.e., when the
decision maker has domain expertise and when the task is complex). For example, Dane
et al. (2012) found that, when solving non-decomposable tasks (i.e., tasks that cannot
easily be solved using analytical procedures), experts perform worse using analysis than
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intuition. Thus, given tasks that are conducive to intuitive decision-making, analytical
cognitive processing seems to disrupt an expert’s ability to make an effective intuitive
decision. Research relating to clinical decision-making (Wimmers et al., 2005), motor
skills (e.g., Beilock et al., 2004; Beilock et al., 2002; Gray, 2004), and verbal
overshadowing (e.g., Lane & Schooler, 2004; Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Melcher &
Schooler, 2004) provides further evidence that analysis may effect intuition.
Contrary to the general finding that analysis may disrupt expert intuition, in a
study that explored the effects of expertise and cognitive strategy on solving complex
problems related to college life, Pretz (2008) found that more experienced individuals
scored better when required to use an analytical strategy than an intuitive strategy.
However, there are limitations of the study that could have caused the anomaly. For one,
the majority of the items selected to represent complex problems in Pretz’s (2008) study
were social and inter-personal problems such as living with a stealing roommate and
maintaining friendships (see Figure 2 for an example). Since these problems were social
in nature, they do not necessarily represent problems that would require extensive
domain-specific experience.
Recall that expert intuition refers to highly complex, domain-relevant mental
schemas that are a result of extensive experience in the focal domain (Chase & Simon,
1973b; Dane & Pratt, 2007). Examples of such domain experts include seasoned
firefighters and chess grandmasters. In comparison, the social problems used for Pretz’s
(2008) study lack the level of domain specificity that typically leads to expert intuition. In
addition, Pretz (2008) measured domain expertise by college tenure. Given the social
nature of the problems, it is not clear that college tenure would count as domain relevant
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expertise. Therefore, although Pretz’s (2008) findings may generalize to social problemsolving behavior among undergraduates, the findings do not provide strong support to the
argument that experts are better off using analysis than intuition.
Figure 2
Sample Problems – Pretz (2008)

Purpose and Research Questions
As already noted, analytical employee selection methods have been repeatedly
found to outperform intuitive methods when recruiting for low complexity jobs (e.g.,
Conway et al., 1995; Huffcutt & Arthur, 1994; Levashina et al., 2014; Wiener &
Cronshaw, 1988). However, and as also previously discussed, when job complexity
increase, the effectiveness of analytical techniques has been found to decrease (Huffcutt
et al., 2001; Levashina et al., 2014). Consequently, for complex jobs, intuition may be a
better way to make an effective hiring decision. Therefore, and as discussed in chapter 1,
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the current study seeks to answer the following research questions: can intuition lead to
accurate hiring decisions for complex jobs; and if so, under what conditions is this more
likely to occur?
Since the decision maker’s domain expertise has been found to impact the
effectiveness of intuitive judgment for complex tasks (e.g., Dane et al., 2012), the present
study investigated if these findings hold true in a specific context – that of employee
selection. In addition, an individual’s cognitive style has an impact on the decisionmaking process (Hodgkinson & Clark, 2007). Hence, this study attempted to answer the
aforementioned research questions by examining the impact of the interviewer’s domain
expertise and cognitive style on the effectiveness of an intuitive hiring decision when
recruiting for a complex job.
This paper also attempted to investigate common organizational factors that could
disrupt an expert’s ability to make an effective intuitive decision. More specifically, the
paper explored how introducing procedural accountability impacts expert intuition, and
as described earlier, considered the research question: how does procedural
accountability impact the accuracy of an expert’s intuitive judgment?
In order to answer the research questions of this study, the following section
details the hypotheses for factors that influence the effectiveness of intuition when
recruiting for complex jobs.
Hypotheses Development
The effectiveness of intuition can be influenced by individual factors such as the
decision maker’s domain expertise and cognitive style as well as contextual factors such
as task complexity. When attempting to examine the conditions in which intuition can be
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an effective mode of decision-making, it is important to consider the impact of such
factors. Accordingly, this paper examined the impact of interviewer’s domain expertise
(i.e., prior experience in recruiting for a complex job) and cognitive style on the accuracy
of an intuitive hiring decision when recruiting for a complex job. Hypotheses 1-3
explored these factors.
Given conditions that are conducive to intuitive decision-making, it is also
important to consider what organizational factors could disrupt an expert’s ability to
make an effective intuitive decision. Specifically, hypothesis 4 focused on the impact of
procedural accountability on expert intuition. However, since job complexity is a
necessary condition for each hypothesis, it is important to first clarify job complexity
within the context of this study.
Job Complexity
Consistent with Campbell’s (1984) definition of complexity (and as defined in
chapter 1), a complex job is a position that has many tacit elements that leads to
successful job performance. Similar to expert intuition, tacit knowledge involves the
development of mental models that shape an individual’s perspective and their
understanding of how best to proceed in a given situation and is a result of extensive
experience in a specific domain (Nonaka, 1994). Unlike explicit knowledge, which
involves codifiable facts and theories, tacit knowledge involves knowing “how” (Grant,
1996), in such a way that the knowledge cannot easily be codified (Nonaka, 1994).
Since there are only a few tacit elements that lead to job success when job
complexity is low, it is relatively easier to ascertain the knowledge, skills, and abilities
that are required for successful job performance. This is because the job requirements for
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a low complexity job are fairly straightforward. For example, the qualifications of
stenographers can be adequately assessed by testing their short handwriting skills, typing
speed and accuracy, and transcription skills. Thus, the lower the job complexity, the
clearer the prescriptive causes of good performance, and the easier it is to standardize
selection criteria (Dipboye, 1994). Consequently, since the objective data clearly
establishes the qualifications of the candidate, the interviewer does not need to use their
intuitive judgment to make a hiring decision. This argument is reinforced in employee
selection research as analytical selection methods have typically been found to be more
reliable than intuitive methods for low complexity jobs (e.g., Conway et al., 1995;
Huffcutt & Arthur, 1994; Levashina et al., 2014; Wiener & Cronshaw, 1988).
In contrast, when job complexity is high, it is much more difficult to specify
evaluation standards or to identify factors that contribute to good job performance due to
the ambiguity surrounding the correct formula for successful job performance (Chen et
al., 2008). For example, studies have found that the validity of the structured interview
(an analytical method) is lower for complex jobs (Huffcutt et al., 2001; Levashina et al.,
2014; Pulakos & Schmitt, 1995) such as federal investigative agents, managers,
physicians, and engineers. This is likely due to the inadequacy of the structured questions
to capture the complex performance outcomes as well as the inability of the standardized
scoring system to adequately rate the answers given by candidates for complex positions
(Huffcutt et al., 2004).
Based on the aforementioned findings, the argument that task complexity is a
necessary condition for effective intuition appears to hold true in an employee selection
context. Intuition may be more effective for complex jobs and not so effective for low
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complexity jobs. Given that analytical methods have been repeatedly found to outperform
intuition for low complexity jobs, it seems a futile exercise to measure the impact of
intuition for low complexity jobs. Therefore, the present study solely focused on complex
jobs.
Having clarified job complexity within the context of this study, and laying the
foundation that intuition may be an effective method of decision-making for complex
jobs, the next section presents the hypothesis that compares the effectiveness of intuitive
versus analytical hiring decisions for complex jobs.
As depicted in Figure 3, I argue that for complex jobs, the accuracy of a hiring
decision is greater when the interviewers use intuitive rather than analytical selection
processes. This is also the main effect as depicted in Figure 4, cells I versus A.
Figure 3
Conceptual Model for Hypotheses 1-3
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Building on the previous argument, I also propose that when the decision maker is
an expert, the accuracy of an intuitive decision over analysis is amplified (cells EI versus
EA in Figure 4). Furthermore, I expect that those who are experts to be able to make
more accurate intuitive hiring decisions than those who are non-experts (cells EI versus
NI in Figure 4).
Figure 4
Accuracy of Intuition versus Analysis for Complex Jobs
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Accuracy of Intuition versus Analysis for Complex Jobs
Although the debate continues, there is some evidence that intuition may be more
effective than analytical decision-making for complex and ill-structured tasks. When the
task is complex (Dijksterhuis, 2004), and the decision-making environment is uncertain,
complex, and/or subject to time pressures (Agor, 1986; Burke & Miller, 1999), intuition
may be a more appropriate way to make a decision. In support, Dijksterhuis (2004) used
a series of experiments to investigate the role of conscious (i.e., analytical) and
unconscious (i.e., intuitive) thought in solving complex tasks. The tasks in his study were
choosing an apartment and choosing a roommate, both of which were ill-structured and
ambiguous tasks. Throughout the experiments, intuition was found to be more effective
than analysis in making quality decisions.
The ability of intuition to outperform analysis for complex tasks can be attributed
to the limitations of the conscious mind to process a large number of disparate pieces of
information (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dane & Pratt, 2007, Simon, 1957). Due to this limited
capacity, the conscious mind tends to focus on a restricted number of problem attributes.
These attributes may even be non-optimal criteria, which in turn produce non-optimal
results (Hogarth, 2002). The unconscious mind, on the other hand, is able to holistically
combine disparate pieces of information to provide an effective solution. Therefore,
compared to intuitive thought, analytical thought is more likely to lead to extreme errors
(Hammond et al., 1987).
In an employee selection context, recruiting for a complex job is equivalent to a
complex task. Recall that a complex job is a position that has numerous tacit elements
that lead to successful job performance. Since tacit elements cannot be explicitly stated,
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an accurate prototype of an ideal employee cannot be developed. It is subsequently
difficult to explicitly state the selection criteria for complex jobs. Therefore, a purely
analytical selection process may not be effective for candidate selection. Supporting this
argument, research has found that as job complexity increases, the effectiveness of
analytical selection methods decreases (Huffcutt et al., 2001; Levashina et al., 2014;
Pulakos & Schmitt, 1995).
Considering the inadequacy of analytical hiring methods for complex jobs, and
since intuition has been found to be more effective than analysis for complex tasks, I
argue that, for a complex job, an intuitive hiring decision will be more accurate than an
analytical hiring decision. Therefore, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: For complex jobs, the accuracy of a hiring decision is greater when
decision makers use an intuitive (I) rather than analytical (A) decision-making
process.
Impact of Domain Expertise on the Accuracy of Intuition over Analysis
Building on hypothesis above, it is important to consider the conditions in which
the effectiveness of intuition over analysis is amplified. As such, the purpose of this
section is to explore the impact of interviewer expertise on the effectiveness of intuition
over analysis when recruiting for a complex job (i.e., comparison of cell EI and EA in
Figure 3). An expert interviewer is one that has experience in recruiting for a particularly
complex job category such as healthcare professionals.
Given a complex task, the effectiveness of intuition has been found to be greater
when the decision maker has domain expertise (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973a; Dijkstra et
al, 2013; Hammond et al., 1987). Individuals gain domain expertise when they have an
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extensive domain related knowledge and experience. As a result of this knowledge and
experience, domain experts develop highly complex, domain-relevant mental schemas
(Dane & Pratt, 2007). Using these mental schemas, domain experts are often able to
make highly accurate intuitive decisions (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). For example, Chase
and Simon (1973b) found that chess grandmasters were able to instantaneously recognize
50,000 to 100,000 chess patterns and make the best move without much reflection.
In comparison, expertise may not increase the effectiveness of an analytical
decision for a complex task. For example, Dane et al. (2012) found that, among
participants who used analysis to solve a complex task, there was no significant
difference in task performance between those with high expertise and those with low
expertise. In fact, other studies have found that prompting an expert to use analysis may
negatively impact decision quality (e.g., Wimmers et al., 2005, Melcher & Schooler,
2004). This may be especially true for complex tasks that, because they are ill-structured
and ambiguous in nature, may not have clear objective criteria for making an accurate
decision. Therefore, if experts are prompted to use analysis to solve a complex task, they
may focus on non-optimal criteria that may limit the effectiveness of their decision.
Based on the preceding discussion, although expertise has a positive impact on
the effectiveness of intuition, it may not have a significant impact on the effectiveness of
analysis. In fact, expertise may limit the effectiveness of analytical decision-making for
complex tasks. Therefore, I argue that domain experts who use intuition to solve a
domain relevant complex task will be more effective than those who use analysis. In line
with this argument, when recruiting for a complex job, if the interviewer is an expert with
prior experience in recruiting for a similar complex job, intuition may be more useful
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than analysis to make an accurate hiring decision. This is because, due to highly
developed and domain-relevant mental schemas, an expert interviewer may be better able
to holistically combine the disparate pieces of available information about the candidate.
Since a complex job has many tacit elements that lead to successful job performance, the
elaborate mental schemas allow the expert interviewer to unconsciously and
automatically consider these tacit elements and determine the compatibility of the
candidate.
Conversely, if the expert interviewer is required to make an analytical hiring
decision, since it is difficult to set accurate selection standards for a complex job, the
interviewer will be forced to focus on non-optimal criteria. A decision based on nonoptimal criteria will lead to a non-optimal decision. Thus, compared to an intuitive
decision that holistically combines the explicit as well as the implicit elements for job
success, an expert interviewer’s analytical decision will be less accurate. Therefore, I
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2a: For complex jobs, the accuracy of a hiring decision is greater
when the interviewer is an expert and the interviewer uses intuitive (EI) rather
than analytical (EA) decision processes.
Impact of Expert versus Non-Expert on the Accuracy of Intuition
As discussed in the development of hypothesis one, for a complex job, intuition is
a more effective mode of decision-making than analysis. In addition, as argued in the
development of hypothesis 2a, for a complex job, the accuracy of intuition over analysis
is amplified when the decision maker has domain expertise. This section will focus on the
impact of interviewer domain expertise in increasing the accuracy of intuition. For this
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purpose, the accuracy of an intuitive decision between experts and non-experts will be
compared (i.e., cell EI and NI in Figure 3).
The effectiveness of an intuitive decision depends on the nature of the domain
relevant mental schemas established in the mind of the decision maker. These mental
schemas can either be (1) simple heuristics with minimal domain-relevant knowledge, or
(2) complex cognitive maps with a high level of domain-specific information (Dane &
Pratt, 2007). Those with simple heuristics are individuals who have little to no knowledge
and experience in the focal domain. Due to this reason, the non-expert’s mental schemas
lack the domain sensitivity and the capacity to process the information presented in a
complex problem. Thus, an intuitive decision of a non-expert may not be optimal.
However, as previously noted, due to extensive domain-relevant knowledge and
experience, an expert possesses highly complex, domain-relevant mental schemas. These
complex mental schemas allow the expert to quickly and automatically process a large
amount of disparate information and make an effective intuitive decision. Thus,
compared to a non-expert, and expert’s intuitive judgment is much more effective.
Consistent with the argument above, Chase and Simon (1973a) found that,
compared to novice chess players, master chess players are able to extract more
information from a brief exposure to a chess position. As a result, they were better able to
re-construct those positions than novice chess players. The authors concluded that the
superior performance of the master chess players is due to their ability to encode the
chess positions to perceptual chunks, each of which contains familiar configurations of
chess pieces.
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Similarly, Dane et al. (2012), who conducted two experimental studies to examine
the impact of domain expertise on the effectiveness of intuition, found that there was a
significant difference in the task performance between participants with high expertise
and participants with low expertise. In the first study, which asked participants to assess
the difficulty of a basketball shot, domain expertise was determined by the number of
years of experience playing competitive basketball. In the second study, which asked
participants to identify real and fake designer handbags, domain expertise was
determined by the total number of designer handbags owned by each participant. In both
studies, those with high domain expertise outperformed those with low domain expertise
thus supporting the argument that domain expertise can increase the effectiveness of an
intuitive decision.
Contrary to the findings of research related to intuition, in employee selection,
some scholars argue that the effectiveness of intuition does not increase with experience
(Highhouse, 2008b). Much of this argument is based on the success of analytical
techniques over interviewer’s intuition in selecting candidates for low complexity jobs.
However, since the effectiveness of analytical methods has been found to diminish as job
complexity increases, interviewer expertise may have a critical role in making an
effective hiring decision. As noted by Dipboye (1994), since experts generally have more
complex, reliable, and accessible knowledge structures than non-experts, compared to
non-experts, expert interviewers may be more effective in making intuitive hiring
decisions. This is because, compared to non-experts, experts have a higher capacity to
identify idiosyncrasies of a candidate and to interpret configurations of traits that lead to

51

job success. In addition, experts may be better able to holistically combine the candidate
data collected from different sources to make an effective intuitive decision.
Based on the foregoing discussion, I argue that interviewer expertise increases the
accuracy of a hiring decision if the position being recruited for is a complex job. This
argument is, in fact, consistent with the research in intuition that has found expertise to
increase the effectiveness of intuitive decisions when solving complex tasks. Therefore, I
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2b: For complex jobs, the accuracy of a hiring decision is greater
when the decision maker using intuitive selection processes is an expert (EI)
rather than a non-expert (NI)
Impact of Cognitive Style on the Accuracy of a Hiring Decision
The hypotheses so far only considered one interviewer related factor that impacts
the accuracy of intuitive and analytical hiring decisions, namely interviewer’s domain
expertise. As discussed earlier, another aspect to consider is the interviewer’s cognitive
style. As such, the next hypothesis focuses on the impact of the interviewer’s cognitive
style on the accuracy of intuitive and analytical hiring decisions (i.e., comparison of cell
II and AA with IA and AI in Figure 5)
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Figure 5
Impact of Cognitive Style on the Accuracy of a Hiring Decision

Most individuals are predisposed to prefer one cognitive style over the other
(Epstein et al., 1996; Norris & Epstein, 2011). This preference then influences the
individual’s approach to solving a problem (Hodgkinson & Clark, 2007). Those with an
analytical style prefer a deliberate, logical approach whereas those with an intuitive style
prefer a more ‘gut feeling’ approach.
As it relates to employee selection, the cognitive style of interviewers impacts the
preference for intuitive or analytical hiring methods (e.g., Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014).
Interviewers who are analytical have a more favorable perception towards analytical
selection methods (Levashina et al., 2014). For example, Chen et al. (2008) found that
those who have an analytical cognitive style (versus those that have an intuitive cognitive
style) had positive reactions towards the highly structured interview, which is an
analytical style interview. These authors also found that interviewers with an analytical
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cognitive style reacted more positively towards the highly structured interview for high
complexity jobs. On the other hand, managers with an intuitive cognitive style prefer to
use their intuition in employee selection (Lodato et al., 2011; Miles & Sadler-Smith,
2014).
A mismatch between an individual’s inherent cognitive style and the cognitive
strategy (i.e., the actual decision-making approach) used to solve a particular problem
may result in a negative outcome (Hodgkinson & Clark, 2007). However, congruence
between an individual’s cognitive style and the mode induced by task properties will
result in better outcomes (Friedman et al., 1985). For example, Brigham et al. (2007)
found that owner-managers whose cognitive style matched the decision-making structure
of their organization were more satisfied and had fewer intentions to exit the business.
Although the authors did not attempt to measure the success of the organization, it can be
inferred that those who did not want to exit the business was likely more successful.
Based on the aforementioned findings, I propose that there is a difference between
the individuals whose inherent cognitive style match the employee selection method
compared to those whose cognitive style does not match the employee selection method.
Furthermore, since a match between the cognitive style and the cognitive strategy may
produce better outcomes, I propose that those whose cognitive style match the employee
selection method will perform better than those whose cognitive style does not match the
employee selection method. Thus, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3: For complex jobs, the accuracy of a hiring decision is greater when
the selection method is aligned with the interviewer’s cognitive style.
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Effect of Procedural Accountability on Expert Intuition
The secondary research question of this paper is: how does procedural
accountability impact the accuracy of an expert’s intuitive judgment? Consequently, as
illustrated in Figure 6, the next hypothesis focuses on the impact of procedural
accountability on expert intuition.
Figure 6
Conceptual Model for Hypothesis 4

Individuals gain expert intuition when they have extensive domain-relevant
knowledge and experience (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Expert intuition can lead to effective
decisions when (1) the task is complex (Dane et al., 2012; Dijksterhuis, 2004), and when
(2) the task environment has a high level of uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity, time
pressure, lack of data, and/or more than one reasonable solution (Agor, 1986; Burke &
Miller, 1999). While such conditions are often conducive to expert intuition, we have
little knowledge of organizational factors that could potentially disrupt expert intuition.
Phrases such as “paralysis by analysis” (Langley, 1995) suggest that overanalyzing and searching for structure might adversely affect intuitive judgment (Shapiro
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& Spence, 1997). Given that intuition is an unconscious (Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005)
and automatic process (Kahneman, 2003), I suggest that when individuals consciously
and deliberately evaluate their decisions, their intuitive process may be obstructed. In
fact, increased analysis of one’s own decision-making process has been found to disrupt
task execution and lead to decreased performance (Baumeister, 1984; Wilson &
Schooler, 1991). This is especially true for domain experts as studies in clinical decisionmaking (Wimmers et al., 2005), motor skills (e.g., Beilock et al., 2004; Beilock et al.,
2002; Gray, 2004), and verbal overshadowing (e.g., Melcher & Schooler, 2004) have
found deliberate, analytical cognitive processing to inhibit expert intuition.
What could cause an expert to forgo their intuition and rely on deliberate,
analytical cognitive processing? One such potential organizational factor is the
requirement to account for the decision. Specifically, procedural accountability may
induce analytical thinking. In support, research has found procedural accountability to
increase the attentiveness of the decision maker to the decision-making process (e.g.,
Brtek & Motowidlo, 2002) leading to a more extensive analysis of information (e.g.,
Doney & Armstrong, 1996). Therefore, I argue that when decision makers are aware they
will have to account for the process used to make their decision, they will use more
deliberate, analytical thought processes.
As noted, these deliberate, analytical thought processes may disrupt intuitive
thinking (Baumeister, 1984; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). This disruption of the intuitive
process may have a positive effect on an individual with limited expertise who does not
have the necessary domain-relevant knowledge and experience to have developed expert
intuition. Therefore, a beginner’s intuitive decision is likely based on non-relevant
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criteria and will typically result in a sub-optimal decision. For example, through an
experimental study, Brtek and Motowidlo (2002) found procedural accountability to
increase decision quality in employee selection by driving the decision maker to be more
attentive (i.e., deliberate and analytical) to the process. The participants of the experiment
were undergraduate students who simulated employment interviews by watching
videotapes of managers answering an interview question and then rated the managers on
their leadership potential. The students had very little, if any, domain-relevant experience
to judge the leadership potential of a manager. These findings support the arguments that
(1) procedural accountability leads to deliberate and analytical thinking, and (2)
deliberate, analytical thinking allows a novice to increase decision quality.
Unlike novices, in a context conducive to intuitive decision-making, experts have
the ability to make effective intuitive decisions (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973a; Dane et al.,
2012; Dijkstra et al, 2013; Hammond et al., 1987). Contrary to the effects on novices,
disrupting an expert’s intuitive thinking process by inducing them to use more deliberate,
analytical thinking can negatively affect decision quality. For example, Dane et al. (2012)
found that experts who were asked to analytically solve a task performed worse than
those who used intuition. Furthermore, Wimmers et al. (2005) found that experts’ recall
diminished when they were required to use a more analytical thought process.
Given the above, it is expected that procedural accountability induces deliberate,
analytical thought processes that disrupt intuitive thinking and, as a result, can adversely
affect an expert’s decision quality. Likewise, I argue that in a context conducive to
intuitive decision-making, procedural accountability will negatively impact the
effectiveness of expert intuition. Thus, I hypothesize:
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Hypothesis 4: For complex jobs, procedural accountability will moderate the
positive relationship between an expert’s intuitive processes and the accuracy of
a hiring decision such that the relationship is weaker (less positive) when
decision-makers are required to account for the quality of the procedure used in
making their decisions

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter includes a discussion of the research methodology used to examine
the hypotheses listed in Chapter 2. The hypotheses were tested via a two-part
experimental study. The first part addressed hypotheses 1-3 while the second part
addressed hypothesis 4. In both, participants assumed the role of an interviewer charged
with the task of employee selection for a complex job. Participants in this role reviewed
10 pairs of candidate interviews, and for each pair, decided which one of the two
candidate responses was a better choice. This process of a forced choice is a similar
methodological approach as that used by Kausel et al., (2016). Following completion of
the task, participants completed a questionnaire that assessed their cognitive style, the
success of experimental manipulations, and collected demographic information such as
age and gender. Both the experiment and the ensuing questionnaire were administered
electronically via Qualtrics.
Participants and Setting
The healthcare staffing industry was selected as the job setting as it amply
demonstrates the previously described criteria for job complexity. Healthcare staffing
companies recruit and place healthcare professionals (e.g., nurses, physicians,
pharmacists, speech and language pathologists, and other types of therapists) at various
healthcare facilities (e.g., hospitals). Due to the complex nature of healthcare, the role of
a healthcare professional typically involves a high level of ambiguity and complexity.
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The participants for the expert sample were those with healthcare recruiting
experience within the United States (N = 79, 47 females, average age = 33 years, average
healthcare recruiting experience was between 1 and 3 years). These recruiters are
responsible for recruiting healthcare professionals and typically go through extensive
training on recruiting in this field. Not only do the recruiters have to ensure that the
candidates sufficiently meet the job requirements, but they also have to evaluate other
factors such as the candidate’s past job performance as well as their current availability,
flexibility, cultural fit, seriousness about taking a new position, and monetary
expectations. Through this complex recruiting process, recruiters are expected to identify
any irregularities in the candidate’s profile. In addition to these experts, a group of nonexperts without recruiting experience were also sampled. The non-expert sample
consisted of undergraduate students from several universities in the southeast United
States (N = 83, 41 females, average age = 20 years). This method of using an expert and
non-expert sample is consistent with prior studies that explore the effect of interviewer
expertise on decision accuracy (e.g., Maurer, 2002). All participants were offered the
opportunity to participate in a raffle for four $50 Starbucks gift cards.
Development of Interview Questions and Responses
The preliminary step of the experimental design was to create the interview
questions that were used for the study. Interview questions were developed following
methods similar to prior employment interview related studies (e.g., Campion, Campion,
& Hudson, 1994; Campion, Pursell, & Brown 1988; Day & Carroll, 2003; DeGroot &
Kluemper, 2007; Maurer, 2002; Maurer & Lee, 2000; Pulakos et al., 1995; Weekley &
Gier, 1987). First, the critical incident technique was used to identify behaviors that
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affect job performance. The critical incident technique involves the systematic process of
collecting direct observations of behavior to assist in solving practical problems and
developing broad psychological principals (Flanagan, 1954). Specifically, 210 behaviors
of healthcare professionals that lead to a successful hire were identified by interviewing
another sample of healthcare recruiters. Once the critical incidents were gathered, the
author, who has over 11 years of experience in healthcare recruiting, reviewed and sorted
the incidents into groups of similar incidents to form underlying job dimensions. Through
this process, 12 job dimensions were identified (see Table 2). To assess the accuracy of
the categorization, an expert sample of three healthcare recruiters (average healthcare
recruiting experience = seven years) were asked to review and match a sample of the
critical incidents to its corresponding job dimension. There was 100 percent agreement
among the expert sample that the behaviors were appropriately categorized into job
dimensions.
Table 2
Job Dimensions
1) Attention to Detail
2) Attitude
3) Dependability
4) Communication
5) Client Focus
6) Flexibility
7) Honesty
8) Planning and Organization
9) Professionalism
10) Responsiveness
11) Skill and Experience
12) Interpersonal Skills
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Next, situational interview questions were written for 11 of the 12 identified job
dimensions. The “skill and experience” dimension was excluded because an interview
question that measures skill and experience will need to be specific to a particular
healthcare profession (e.g., a nurse would need to be asked a different question than a
speech therapist). Since the goal was to create general interview questions that apply to a
range of healthcare professionals, this dimension was eliminated. The expert sample was
asked to match the interview questions to job dimensions in order to assess how well the
interview questions reflect the job dimensions. Agreement that the interview questions
accurately represent the job dimensions ranged from 66.67 percent to 100 percent with
the average being 90 percent.
Then, for each question, three responses were scripted: 1) a good response, 2) an
average response, and 3) a poor response. In order to assess the accuracy of the ranking
order of the scripted responses, the expert sample was given the three responses for each
question in random order and was asked to rank them based on the quality of the response
to the interview question. The experts were also asked to determine how well the
responses represent realistic candidate responses. Consistent with Maurer and Lee (2000)
and Maurer (2002), a minimum acceptable level of agreement for sorting decisions is 66
percent. Thus, adjustments to the interview questions and responses were made until a
minimum of 66 percent agreement was achieved (the agreement for some questions were
as low as 33 percent on the initial ranking exercise). The final agreement of the ranking
of the candidate responses to each interview question ranged from 66.67 percent to 100
percent with the average being 80 percent. Figure 7 illustrates the interview questions and
responses development process.
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Overall, out of the 11 interview questions, 10 were selected for the experiment
along with the “good” and the “average” candidate response for each question (See
Appendix A). The question that was eliminated was the one that reflected “interpersonal
skills”. This is because, compared to the other questions, this question measured a more
generic trait that may not be specific to healthcare staffing.
With regard to the interview question and answer scripts, even though there was
acceptable agreement among the expert sample on which candidate response is the best in
each interview scenario, similar levels of agreement were not obtained from a different
sample of healthcare recruiting experts (N = 5, average healthcare recruiting experience =
13 years) who later reviewed the audio recordings of the candidate responses in the same
format as the study participants. Thus, the interview questions and answers were further
edited and re-tested using a sample of four healthcare recruiting experts (average
healthcare recruiting experience = nine years). The candidate responses were adjusted
until a minimum of three out of the four experts agreed on which was the better candidate
response for every interview scenario.
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Figure 7
Interview Questions and Responses Development Process

Identify critical incidents through employee Interviews:
210 critical incidents
Group similar critical incidents to form job dimension categories:
12 job dimensions were identified (10 dimensions selected for the study)
Expert review to assess accuracy of critical incident categorization
Three healthcare recruiters (average experience = 7)
Develop interview questions for each job dimension category

Expert review to ensure the questions accurately represent the job dimensions

Develop 3 responses for each question: 1) good, 2) average, 3) poor

Expert review to assess the accuracy and realism of responses

Development of Interview Recordings
As previously described, the target setting for the present study is the healthcare
staffing industry. Since most staffing companies in this specific industry work on a
national scale, it is neither geographically nor economically feasible to conduct in-person
interviews with every candidate. As a result, candidate interviews are typically conducted
by phone. Therefore, in order to create a realistic interview environment, all the scripted
candidate responses were audio recordings. Phone interviews apply to other industries as
well since many professional organizations will conduct a phone interview at some point
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during the interview process, so ultimately, the results of this study should be
generalizable to a broader population than just healthcare.
Using the previously developed interview questions and responses, 10 candidate
interview scenarios were developed. For each scenario, two candidate responses (i.e.,
good and an average response) were recorded for a total of 20 audio recordings. Only one
question per interview scenario, as opposed to several questions, was used for two
reasons. The first reason was to control experiment length. Since the target participants
include working professionals, a lengthy experiment may result in decreased participation
and task completion. The second reason was to offer a reasonable number of decision
scenarios so that the participants’ decision accuracy score was based on multiple hiring
decisions (i.e., 10) and not based on a single decision. Prior interview related studies have
also used a single interview question (e.g., Brtek & Motowidlo, 2002).
As noted, each interview scenario was developed where, for the same interview
question, one candidate response was good and the other was average. The good-average
response format was used because, if a pair of interviews consists of a good-poor
response, the difference between the candidates may be easily recognizable and
consequently, selecting the better choice may be relatively easy. In contrast, the
difference between a good and an average response is less recognizable, which then
makes the choice more complex. Therefore, the good-average response format was used
to reduce the contrast effect.
Five different actors were used for the 20 voice recordings. Care was taken to
ensure that each actor had an equal number of recordings (i.e., four recordings each) and
an equal number of good and average responses (i.e., two good responses and two
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average responses). In addition, the same pair of actors did not appear in more than one
interview scenario (i.e., the 10 interview scenarios had different combinations of actors).
To check for potential cueing effects due to the voice differences of the actors and
technical aspects of the audio recordings, a sample of 11 doctoral students at a
southeastern university were asked to rate each of the 20 voice recordings on three
aspects – clarity, volume, and understandability. Similar to Maurer and Lee (2000) and
Maurer (2002), the raters used a five-point Likert scale to note their level of agreement
for each aspect (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). One-way analysis of
variance found significant differences between the five actors for each of the three
aspects [clarity: F(4, 215) = 8.92, p < .01; volume: F(4, 215) = 4.37, p < .01;
understandability: F(4, 215) = 21.08, p < .01]. Post hoc analysis revealed one actor’s
voice to be problematic. Thus, the candidate responses initially recorded using the
problematic voice was re-recorded with a new voice.
An updated survey of the 20 voice recordings with the changed voice was sent to
another sample of current and former doctoral students at a southeastern university. The
survey was completed by 11 respondents. For those voice actors that remained the same,
the data from the first sample was combined with the data from the second sample. Oneway analysis of variance revealed significant differences among the voice actors for two
of the three measured aspects [clarity: F(4, 391) = 3.24, p < .01; volume: F(4, 391) =
1.57, p = .18; understandability: F(4, 391) = 4.697, p < .01]. Based on these results, it
was determined that the best way to control for voice differences is to use a single voice
for all 20 recordings. Thus, the candidate responses were re-recorded using a single
female voice.
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Study: Part One
Participants and Setting
As previously noted, the setting was the healthcare staffing industry. The
participants for the expert sample were recruiters employed by healthcare staffing
companies that have operations within the United States. For the expert sample, the
online experiment was distributed using email and LinkedIn messages. The non-expert
sample was undergraduate students from several southeastern universities. For the nonexperts, the online experiment was distributed by their class instructor via a link in an
email.
Both the experts and non-experts were randomly assigned to either an intuitive or
an analysis condition, thereby creating four experimental groups [i.e., expert-intuition (N
= 32; expert-analysis (N = 24); non-expert-intuition (N = 42); non-expert-analysis (N =
41)]. The number of participants in the expert groups in the present study exceeds the
samples used in some prior studies that use a similar methodological approach (e.g., Dane
et al., 2012).
For example, Dane et al. (2012) conducted two studies to test the effect of
expertise in making intuitive versus analytical decisions when solving a complex task.
The task in study one involved determining the difficulty of basketball shots and in study
two, identifying authentic versus fake designer handbags. All participants in both studies
were undergraduate business students. The total expert sample in study one was 30
(between both the intuition and analysis conditions) and the total expert sample in study
two was 25 (between both the intuition and analysis conditions). Authors do not specify
the breakdown of experts in the intuition versus analysis conditions in both studies. Given
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the total number of experts across both conditions (i.e., 30 in study one and 25 in study
two) it can be inferred that each condition (i.e., intuition and analysis) had less than 20
participants in each of the two studies. Comparatively, each of the experimental
conditions in the present study has a higher number of experts (i.e., N = 32 in expertintuition and N = 24 in expert-analysis). In addition, each of the expert and non-experts
groups exceeds the minimum number of 20 participants per experimental condition
suggested by Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson (2010).
Task and Procedure
Participants were asked to assume the role of an interviewer charged with the task
of employee selection for a complex job (i.e., healthcare professionals). They were
exposed to the 10 interview scenarios, and in each scenario, were asked to select the best
response out of two candidate responses to the same interview question. While an
alternate method could have been to ask the participants to rate the candidate responses to
the interview questions without having to make a selection, in a typical employment
selection context, interviewers are required to make a selection. Therefore, a forced
choice between the candidates represented a more realistic employment selection
situation. As a decision aid, for all interview questions, the participants were given the
job dimension that was being assessed along with the definition of that job dimension
(see Appendix B for a sample interview scenario as presented to the participants).
The experiment was administered electronically using Qualtrics survey software.
The participants completed the task on their computers, and in the case of most of the
expert sample, at their work desks. This method induced a natural work environment as
the phone interviews are generally conducted at the recruiters’ desks. After the 10
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interview scenarios, all participants completed a questionnaire that assessed the quality of
the experimental manipulation, participants’ cognitive style, gender, age, and healthcare
recruiting experience.
Experimental Conditions
Similar to prior studies that explored the effect of intuition in decision-making
(e.g., Dane et al., 2012; Pretz, 2008), both the expert and non-expert samples were
randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions (see Figure 8).
Figure 8
Experimental Conditions

Intuition Condition. Participants in the intuition condition were asked to make
their decision solely based on their intuition, first impression, and gut feeling. Similar to
Dane et al., (2011) and Dane et al., (2012), they were asked not to think too hard and
were encouraged to select the first decision that came to their mind (see Appendix C for
specific instructions).
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Analysis Condition. In order to induce analytical reasoning, the participants in the
analytical condition were given explicit instructions to use deliberation, logic, and
analysis. This method of inducing analytical cognitive processing is similar to the
methods used in the studies cited above as well as Pretz (2008). Participants were
encouraged to ignore any first impressions and gut feelings and instead to carefully
consider all available information prior to making a decision (see Appendix D for
specific instructions).
Manipulation Check
The manipulation check evaluated whether participants in each condition
complied with expected cognitive manipulations. For this purpose, a four-item measure
adapted from Dane et al. (2011) was used (see Table 3).
Table 3
Manipulation Check – Intuition and Analysis Conditions

Study: Part Two
The purpose of the second part of the study was to answer the last research
question (i.e., how does procedural accountability impact the accuracy of an expert’s
intuitive judgment?) and correspondingly, to test hypothesis 4, which predicted that
procedural accountability will negatively impact expert intuition. An additional sample
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of experts placed in an intuition-procedural accountability condition was gathered and
their decision accuracy was compared to that of individuals in the expert-intuition (no
accountability) condition from the first part of the study.
Participants and Setting
Individuals in the procedural accountability condition included experienced
healthcare recruiters (N = 23). All participants were assigned to an intuition condition.
However, to induce procedural accountability, they were also told that they may be asked
to explain the process they followed in making their decisions.
Task and Procedure
The task was consistent with the online process described earlier (i.e., they
assumed to the role of a healthcare recruiter, reviewed the 10 interview scenarios, and for
each scenario, selected the best candidate response).
Experimental Condition
All participants in the intuition-procedural accountability condition were given
directions similar to those given to the individuals in the intuition condition in the first
part of the study (see Appendix A). However, unlike those in the intuition condition,
they were told that, at the end of the experiment, they will be required to justify the
procedure they followed in making their decisions (see Appendix E for instructions). As
depicted in Figure 9, the intuition-procedural accountability sample was then compared to
the expert-intuition sample in study one.
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Figure 9
Accountability Experimental Conditions

Manipulation Check
At the end of the task, participants were asked to complete a manipulation check
to evaluate if they complied with the manipulations. To assess this, the study adapted
measures used by Dane et al. (2011) and Brtek and Motowidlo (2002). Table 4 details
this five-item measure.
Table 4
Manipulation Check – Procedural Accountability and Intuition Conditions
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Measures
Decision Accuracy
As previously noted, the dependent variable is the accuracy of a hiring decision
for a complex job. Accuracy was measured by calculating the number of times each
participant selected the best candidate response in each of the 10 interview scenarios.
Thus, the accuracy score could range from 0 (i.e., did not select the best candidate
response in any of the interview scenarios) to 10 (selected the best candidate response in
all of the interview scenarios).
In order to ensure the dependent variable was a valid measure of decision
accuracy, three steps were followed. First, the candidate responses were intentionally
written to have one candidate response stronger than the other. Second, the interview
scenario scripts were given to four healthcare recruiting experts (average healthcare
recruiting experience = nine years) to determine if there is a high level of agreement
among the experts on which candidate response is better in each of the 10 interview
scenarios. The candidate responses were adjusted until a minimum of three out of the
four experts agreed on which was the better candidate response for every scenario.
Third, after the audio recordings were completed, five healthcare recruiting
experts (average healthcare recruiting experience = 12 years) viewed the interview
scenarios and listened to the candidate responses in the same online format as the
participants would be expected to do in the subsequent study. This sample of expert raters
did not include any of the experts that previously reviewed the interview scenario scripts.
In addition to providing a definition of each job dimension, the expert raters were given
the characteristics of a good response for every interview question. They were then
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tasked to select the best candidate response in each of the 10 interview scenarios. As
illustrated in Table 5, there was a high level of agreement among experts. Therefore, it
was determined that in the full study, a participant’s accuracy score would be calculated
as the number of times they selected the candidate response that was consistent with the
best response identified by the experts in the pre-test.
Table 5
Expert Agreement on Best Candidate Response
Interview Scenario

1) Attention to Detail
2) Attitude
3) Dependability
4) Communication
5) Client Focus
6) Flexibility
7) Honesty
8) Planning and Organization
9) Professionalism
10) Responsiveness
N=5

Percentage of agreement
on the best candidate
response
100
100
100
80
100
100
80
80
100
100

Cognitive Style
Consistent with the dual process view of information processing, and following
Dane et al. (2011), Pretz (2008), and Pretz and Totz (2007), cognitive style was measured
using the rational-experiential-inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). The instrument
includes a 10-item measure of rational engagement (i.e., preference for analysis) and a
10-item measure of experiential engagement (i.e., preference for intuition). Each item had
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responses ranging from 1 (definitely not true of myself) to 5 (definitely true of myself).
Each item is provided in Table 6 below.
Table 6
Rational-Experiential-Inventory
Rational Engagement Scale
I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something (-)
I enjoy intellectual challenges
I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking (-)
I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking
Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity (-)
I prefer complex problems to simple problems
Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction
(-)
I enjoy thinking in abstract terms
Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is
good enough for me (-)
Learning new ways to think will be very appealing to me
Experiential Engagement Scale
I like to rely on my intuitive impressions
Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems
I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action
I don’t like situations in which I have to rely on intuition (-)
I think there are times when one should rely on one’s intuition
I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings (-)
I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on one’s intuition for important decisions
(-)
I generally don’t depend on my feelings to help me make decisions (-)
I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as
intuitive (-)
I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions
Response range: 1= definitely not true of myself, 5= definitely true of myself
(-) = reverse scored item
Adapted from Pacini and Epstein (1999)
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Domain Expertise
As previously noted, the selection of an expert and non-expert sample was
deliberate. The expert sample included those who have prior experience in healthcare
recruiting. Compared to an individual with no formal training and experience in the field,
a healthcare recruiter who has at least completed the new-hire training process would
already possess a reasonable amount of knowledge on how to accurately qualify a
healthcare professional. For the non-expert sample, the participants were individuals with
no healthcare recruiting experience.
Gender
Prior studies have found gender affected how individuals process information
(e.g., Allinson & Hayes, 1996; Epstein et al., 1996). Therefore, consistent with Dane et
al. (2011), Dane et al. (2012), and Norris and Epstein (2011), this study controlled for
gender.

CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS
This chapter provides a comprehensive review of the data and the analysis
pertaining to testing the hypotheses. First, preliminary analysis such as outliers, the
normality of dependent variable, manipulation checks, cognitive style, and group
differences due to the control variable (i.e., gender) is discussed. The results of the
hypotheses testing are then presented.
Outliers
As an initial step in examining the data, outlier analysis was conducted in order to
eliminate any effects due to observations that are distinctly different from the general
sample. An evaluation of the data set revealed six participants who displayed
inconsistencies in how they responded to survey questions. These respondents were
deemed problematic and were removed. After eliminating those participants, as depicted
in Figure 10, two other potential outliers were recognized. Upon further review, it was
identified that both of the potential outliers were in the non-expert group and scored 2 out
of 10. Since non-experts do not have healthcare recruiting experience, these scores were
not surprising and cannot be considered outliers per se. Therefore, no further outliers
were removed.
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Figure 10
Outliers

Normality of the Dependent Variable
Next, the normality of the dependent variable was assessed. The skewness (-.730)
and kurtosis (.457) were within acceptable levels of + or – 1.96 at the .05 error level (Hair
et al., 2010). Therefore, the dependent measure sufficiently meets the assumption of
normality which is a requisite for the analytical methods used in the present study.
Manipulations
As previously detailed, participants were exposed to three experimental
conditions: 1) intuition, 2) analysis, and 3) intuition-procedural-accountability. Experts
and non-experts were assigned to both intuition and analysis conditions, which resulted in
four groups: 1) expert-intuition, 2) non-expert-intuition, 3) expert-analysis, and 4) nonexpert-analysis. In addition, for the second part of the study, a sample of experts was
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assigned to the intuition-procedural-accountability condition resulting in an expertintuition-procedural accountability group.
In order to induce the desired condition, participants in each experimental
condition were given specific instructions on how to make their decisions (see Appendix
C, D, and E). An analysis of the manipulation check questions was conducted to
determine if the participants complied with these manipulations. Previous experimental
studies have shown that some participants may fail to comply with instructions (e.g.,
Pretz, 2008). Therefore, to increase the accuracy of the final results, it is important to
examine the data to ensure that only the participants that satisfactorily complied with the
manipulation are included in hypotheses testing. To this end, in the present study,
participants in each of the experimental groups were analyzed in order to eliminate those
that did not adhere to the manipulations.
Specifically, participants were given a four-item questionnaire to check if they
complied with the instructions. Two of those statements measured intuitive strategy (i.e.,
“I selected the first choice that came to my mind”, “I relied on my gut instinct”) while
two measured analytical strategy (i.e., “I made my decisions in a logical and systematic
way”, “I analyzed all available information in detail”). In addition to the four
aforementioned statements, individuals in the expert-intuition-procedural-accountability
group were given an additional question to measure if they felt accountable for the
decision-making procedure (i.e., “Did you think you would have to explain the process
you followed in selecting the best candidate response?”). All items were measured using
a 7-point Likert scale that ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree.
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In the expert-intuition group, two participants were eliminated that selected
“neither disagree nor agree” to both intuition manipulation check statements. One
participant was deleted who selected “somewhat disagree” to the “I relied on my gut
instinct” statement. Seven participants who didn’t agree with the “I selected the first
choice that came to my mind” statement but agreed with “I relied on my gut instinct”
statement was retained. This is because, although intuition is generally considered fast,
there is some debate as to whether intuition is always fast (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Thus,
although those seven participants did not select the first choice, they agreed that they
used their intuition by using “gut instinct” to make decisions. The final number of
participants in the expert-intuition group was 32.
In the non-expert-intuition group, one participant was eliminated who selected
“neither disagree nor agree” to both intuition manipulation check statements. Three
participants were eliminated who did not agree with the “I relied on my gut instinct”
statement. Six participants who did not agree with the “I selected the first choice that
came to my mind” statement but agreed with the “I relied on my gut instinct” statement
was retained due to the reasons previously stated. The final number of participants in the
non-expert-intuition condition was 42.
In the expert-analysis group, with the exception of one, all participants who
completed the experiment agreed with the manipulation check statements. The one
exception selected “neither disagree nor agree” to “I analyzed all available information in
detail” and agreed with the “I made my decisions in a logical and systematic way”
statement. Since the participant agreed with at least one statement and was neutral to the
other, there is sufficient evidence that the analytical condition was induced. Thus, the
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response was retained. The final number of participants in the expert-analysis condition
was 24.
In the non-expert-analysis group, six participants were eliminated because they
did not agree with either one or both analysis manipulation check statements. Three were
retained who were neutral (i.e., selected “neither disagree nor agree”) to “I analyzed all
available information in detail” but agreed with the “I made my decisions in a logical and
systematic way” statement. All other participants agreed with both statements. As a
result, 41 participants in the non-expert-analysis condition were used in the final analysis.
In the expert-intuition-procedural-accountability group, 14 participants were
eliminated as they did not agree that they felt accountable for the procedure used in
making their decisions. Thus, 23 participants were used in the final analysis.
To further evaluate if the intuition and analysis manipulations were successful,
univariate analysis of variance was used on the four manipulation check statements. As
depicted in Table 7, the tests revealed a significant difference between the conditions on
how they responded to each of the four manipulation check statements. For the two
statements that measured if the intuition condition was induced, ratings of the participants
in the intuition condition (M = 5.66, SD = 1.30 and M = 6.00, SD = .79 respectively) were
significantly higher than the participants in the analysis condition [M = 2.89, SD = 1.48,
F(1,137) = 138.40 , p < .01, η2 = .50 and M = 3.40, SD = 1.58, F(1,137) = 233.93 , p <
.01, η2 = .53 respectively]. Similarly, For the two statements that measured if the
analysis condition was induced, ratings of the participants in the analysis condition (M =
6.14, SD = .77 and M = 6.12, SD = .86 respectively) were significantly higher than the
participants in the intuition condition [M = 5.66, SD = 1.37, F(1,137) = 7.85, p < .05, η2 =
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.04 and M = 5.41, SD = 1.57, F(1,137) = 10.76, p < .01, η2 = .07 respectively]. Based on
these results, it was concluded that the manipulations were successful.
Table 7
ANOVA Results for Manipulation Check Statements

I selected the first choice that came to my mind
I relied on my gut instinct
I made my decisions in a logical and systematic way
I analyzed all available information in detail
** p < .01, *p < .05

Mean
Intuition
Condition
N = 74
5.66
6.00
5.66
5.41

Mean
Analysis
Condition
N = 65
2.89
3.40
6.14
6.12

F
(1, 137)
138.40**
233.93**
7.85*
10.76**

Cognitive Style
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to determine if the RationalExperiential-Inventory items fit a two-factor model [i.e., rational (analytical) and
experiential (intuitive)] as posited by the dual-process theory. An image of the initial
measurement model (X2 = 421.91) is provided in Figure 11. After the model was
specified and estimated, multiple indices were examined to determine model fit. As
reported in Table 8, the initial model did not meet acceptable fit per guidelines provided
by Hair et al. (2010).
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Figure 11
Initial Measurement Model
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Table 8
Initial Measurement Model Fit Results
Fit Index

Desired

Initial Model

Final Model

Chi-Square/Degrees of
Freedom (CMIN/DF)

Below 2 preferred; 25 acceptable

2.50

1.58

Comparative Fit Index
(CFI)

> .90

.70

.96

Root Mean Square
Error of
< .08
.10
Approximation
(RMSEA)
Note: N = 139; Desired guidelines based on Hair et al. (2010)

.07

Thus, following recommended guidelines by Hair et al. (2010) items were
eliminated one at a time until the model met acceptable fit (X2 = 53.87, CMIN/DF = 1.58,
CFI = .96, RMSEA = .07). In total, ten items with factor loadings less than .5 were
eliminated. The final model had six items for the rational scale and four items for the
experiential scale (see Table 9). Past research has found some evidence that the
experiential scale may not be entirely unidimensional, but rather measure different
aspects of intuition such as affective and automatic intuition (Pretz & Totz, 2007). This
may account for the low factor loadings of many experiential scale items. However, even
though the experiential scale was reduced to four items, based on a review of the
wordings (i.e., face validity), it was determined that the items that were left captured the
preference for intuitive decision-making sufficiently well.
All factor loadings of the final model were above the .5 standard noted by Hair et
al. (2010) (see Table 9). Although the average variance extracted (AVE) for the two
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constructs were slightly lower than .5 (rational = .48 and experiential .45), the composite
reliabilities were greater than the .7 recommended standard (rational = .84, experiential =
.76) by Hair et al. (2010). Per Fornell and Larcker (1981), a researcher may conclude
adequate convergent validity based on reliability even though the average variance
extracted is less than 50 percent. Thus, considering that composite reliability meets
acceptable standards and all factor loading were above .5, it was determined that the
model meets acceptable convergent validity.
To assess discriminant validity, the AVE was compared to the squared
interconstruct correlation (SIC = .03) between the two factors. Since the AVEs for both
constructs was greater than the SIC, discriminant validity was achieved. The Cronbach’s
alphas for the final rational (.84) and experiential (.74) engagement scales were above the
minimum acceptable level of .7 noted by Hair et al. (2010). Consequently, the items for
each scale on the final model were averaged to form two indices (i.e., intuitive and
analytical) for cognitive style.
Table 9
Final Items: Rational-Experiential Inventory
Rational Engagement Scale

Factor
Loadings

I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something (-)

.72

I enjoy intellectual challenges

.57

I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking (-)

.86

I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking

.62

Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity (-)

.74

Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it
is good enough for me (-)

.58
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Experiential Engagement Scale
I like to rely on my intuitive impressions

.59

Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems

.63

I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action

.89

I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions

.51

Response range: 1= definitely not true of myself, 5= definitely true of
myself
(-) = reverse scored item

Differences Due to Gender
Since prior studies have found gender to affect how individuals process
information (e.g., Allinson & Hayes, 1996; Epstein et al., 1996), gender was used as a
control variable. Univariate analysis of variance was used to measure differences in the
decision accuracy score (i.e. dependent variable) based on gender. The test revealed a
marginally significant difference between the groups due to gender [F(1, 160) = 3.11, p =
.08]. Although some prior studies that controlled for gender have found a significant
difference between gender and task performance (e.g., Dane et al., 2012, study 1), some
have not (e.g., Dane et al., 2012, study 2). Thus, gender was controlled in the analysis of
the present study.
Building on these results, the next section discusses the analysis and the findings
of the hypothesis testing. Descriptive statistics and correlations among variables are
provided in Table 10.
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Table 10
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variable

Mean

SD

1

2

1. Experiential Engagement (Intuitive)

3.56

0.68

2. Rational Engagement (Analytical)

4.21

0.71

-0.15

3. Decision Accuracy Score

7.17

1.62

-0.14

0.32**

4. Expertise

0.49

0.50

0.08

0.30**

5. Gender

0.52

0.50

0.06

0.13

3

4

5

_
_
_
_

0.24**
0.14

0.15

_

Note: N = 162; Expertise (0 = Non-expert, 1 = Expert); Gender (0 = Male, 1 = Female);
** p < .01 (two-tailed)

Hypotheses Testing
Hypothesis 1 proposed that for complex jobs, the accuracy of a hiring decision is
greater when the decision makers use an intuitive rather than an analytical decisionmaking process. Thus, to test this hypothesis, the decision accuracy score of those who
were in the intuition condition (N = 74, M = 6.91, SD = 1.75) was compared to those who
were in the analysis condition (N = 65, M = 7.25, SD = 1.47). Contrary to the hypothesis,
at an absolute level, the mean of those in the analysis condition was, in fact, higher than
those in the intuition condition. However, univariate analysis of variance showed no
significant difference between the conditions [F(1, 135) = 1.568, p = .21). Therefore,
hypothesis 1 was not supported.
Hypothesis 2a proposed that for complex jobs, the accuracy of a hiring decision is
greater when the interviewer is an expert and the interviewer uses intuitive rather than
analytical decision processes. This hypothesis was tested by comparing the expert-
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intuition (N = 32, M = 7.56, SD = 1.22) and expert-analysis groups (N = 24, M = 7.37, SD
= 1.56). Although at an absolute level the expert-intuition group scored higher than the
expert-analysis group, univariate analysis of variance showed no significant differences
between the groups [F(1, 52) = .075, p = .76]. Thus, hypothesis 2a was not supported.
Hypothesis 2b proposed that for complex jobs, the accuracy of a hiring decision is
greater when the decision maker using intuitive selection processes is an expert rather
than a non-expert. To test this hypothesis, the expert-intuition group (N = 32, M = 7.56,
SD = 1.22) was compared to the non-expert-intuition group (N = 42, M = 6.40, SD =
1.93). Univariate analysis of variance showed a significant difference between the groups
[F(1, 70) = 6.98, p < .01, η2 = .09], thus confirming the hypothesis that experts perform
better using intuition than non-experts. In contrast, when the expert-analysis (N = 24, M =
7.37, SD = 1.56) and the non-expert analysis (N = 41, M = 7.17, SD = 1.43) groups were
compared, there was no significant difference in decision accuracy [F(1, 61) = .25, p =
.62]. These findings suggest that even through expertise may increase the effectiveness of
intuitive decision-making, expertise may not make a difference when it comes to
analytical decision-making. The findings are consistent with Dane et al. (2012) who
found expertise to amplify the effectiveness of intuitive decisions and not analytical
decisions.
Hypothesis 3 proposed that for complex jobs, the accuracy of a hiring decision is
greater when the selection method (i.e., intuitive versus analytical) is aligned with the
interviewer’s cognitive style. In order to test this hypothesis, it was imperative to identify
those whose cognitive style matched and those whose cognitive style did not match the
employee selection method. This was accomplished using the following method. First,
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the items of the corrected model for each of the rational and experiential measures were
averaged to form two indices [i.e., 1) mean score for each participant on the rational scale
and 2) mean score of each participant on the experiential scale]. Then, similar to Pretz
(2008), those above the median for each index was categorized as high in intuitive
(median = 3.75) or analytical (median = 4.33) style, and those at or below the median
were categorized as low in intuitive or analytical style (high was coded 1 and low was
coded 0). This resulted in two additional indices (i.e., one with high and low in intuitive
style and the other with high and low in analytical style). Using these indices, those
whose cognitive style matched the selection method (e.g., those in the intuition condition
who were also high in intuitive style) were coded 1 and those whose cognitive style did
not match the selection method (e.g., those in the intuition condition who were low in
intuitive style) were coded 0. Univariate analysis of variance showed no significant
difference [F(1, 135) = .08, p = .78] between those whose cognitive style matched the
selection method (N = 66, M = 7.12, SD = 1.79) and those whose cognitive style did not
match the selection method (N = 73, M = 7.01, SD = 1.48). Thus, hypothesis 3 was not
supported.
Hypothesis 4 proposed that for complex jobs, procedural accountability will
decrease an expert’s ability to make an effective intuitive decision. To test this
hypothesis, the expert-intuition group (N = 32, M = 7.56, SD = 1.22) was compared to the
expert-intuition-procedural-accountability group (N = 23, M = 7.78, SD = 1.45).
Univariate analysis of variance showed that there was no significant difference [F(1, 51)
= .46, p = .50] between the groups based on their decision accuracy score. Therefore,
hypothesis 4 was not supported.
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In summary, the results of the analysis indicated that hypothesis 2b, which
proposed that expertise will increase the accuracy of an intuitive hiring decision, was
supported. The remaining hypotheses were not supported.
Post-Hoc Analysis
The findings of Dane et al. (2012) suggest that non-experts perform better using
analysis than intuition. Therefore, a post-hoc analysis was conducted to examine if these
findings hold true in the present study. The analysis revealed a significant difference
[F(1, 79) = 4.15, p < .05, η2 = .05] in task performance between the non-experts in the
analysis and intuition conditions. Univariate analysis of variance showed that the nonexperts in the analysis condition (N = 41, M = 7.17, SD = 1.43) performed better than the
non-experts in the intuition condition (N = 42, M = 6.40, SD = 1.93). This finding
suggests that, when the interviewers are non-experts, they are better off using an
analytical approach as oppose to an intuitive approach to make selection decisions. The
implications of the results are discussed in the following section.

CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The purpose of this study was to examine factors that impact the effectiveness of
intuition in employee selection. First, the study attempted to understand if the findings of
intuition research, that intuition can be an effective way to make decisions for complex
tasks when the decision maker is a domain expert, hold true in an employee selection
context. To this end, the study explored the impact of interviewer expertise on the
accuracy of an intuitive versus analytical hiring decision when recruiting for a complex
job. In addition, there is some evidence that individuals will make better decisions when
their decision-making approach is aligned with their cognitive style (e.g., Brigham et al.,
Friedman et al., 1985). The present study tested if these findings extend to employee
selection. Finally, the study examined the impact of procedural accountability on an
expert’s ability to make an effective intuitive decision. To explore these relationships, a
two-part experimental study was conducted using a sample of 79 expert interviewers and
83 non-expert interviewers. The hypotheses were tested by examining group differences
via the analysis of variance statistical method.
Discussion
The present study contributes to our understanding of intuition. Although scholars
have been attempting to delineate what intuition is and when it can be used effectively,
there has been a scarcity of research that explores the role of intuition in making realworld organizational decisions. Specifically relating to employee selection, although
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many managers use intuition to make hiring decisions (Nowicki & Rosse, 2002), scholars
generally scorn upon the use of intuition by highlighting the biases of the intuitive
process (e.g., Highhouse, 2008b). However, to the author’s knowledge, there are no
studies that empirically examine contextual factors that could impact the actual use of
intuition in employee selection. Through a rigorous experimental design that attempted to
capture intuitive and analytical decision-making at the point of action, this study
addressed this limitation by examining the role of job complexity, interviewer expertise,
cognitive style, and procedural accountability on the effectiveness of intuitive hiring
decisions.
This study found that, for the type of complex jobs considered in the present study
(i.e. health care professionals), there is no significant difference between those who used
intuition versus those who used analysis to make hiring decisions. Contrary to the
hypothesis, those who used analysis (M = 7.25) scored a little better than those who used
intuition (M = 6.91), albeit at an insignificant level. Upon further examination, the cause
for this finding is the difference in task performance between experts and non-experts in
each condition. Although experts scored marginally higher using intuition (M = 7.56)
than analysis (M = 7.37), the non-experts scored significantly better using analysis (M =
7.17) than intuition (M = 6.40). Thus, the combined effect of experts and non-experts in
each condition caused those who used analysis to have a higher score than those who
used intuition.
The finding that there is no significant difference between using intuition or
analysis to make hiring decisions indicates that, perhaps, for complex jobs, intuition may
be as good as analytical judgment to make hiring decisions. Most arguments against the
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use of intuition in employee selection are based on hiring decisions made for low
complexity jobs (e.g., e.g., Conway et al., 1995; Huffcutt & Arthur, 1994; Levashina et
al., 2014; Wiener & Cronshaw, 1988). Recall that a complex job was defined as a
position that has many tacit elements that lead to successful job performance. As such, a
low complexity job is one that has only a few tacit elements that lead to job success
which makes it relatively easier to determine and measure the criteria for successful job
performance. Therefore, intuition may not be effective for low complexity jobs.
However, as job complexity increases, studies have found the effectiveness of
analytical techniques to diminish (Huffcutt et al., 2001; Levashina et al., 2014; Pulakos &
Schmitt, 1995). This is because, as job complexity increases, it becomes increasingly
difficult to determine the criteria for job success, which makes it problematic to develop
objective measures to assess a candidate’s ability to be successful on the job. Therefore,
analytical hiring methods may not provide a significant advantage over intuition in
making hiring decisions for complex jobs. In fact, in the general intuition research, there
is some evidence that intuitive decisions are better than analytical decisions when solving
complex tasks (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004).
In the present study, even though there was no support to indicate that intuition
would be better than analysis, the findings do strengthen the argument that intuition may
at least be as good as analysis to make decisions for complex jobs. Further, on a broader
level of decision-making beyond an employee selection context, given the fast-paced
nature of work environments, if there is no difference between intuitive and analytical
decision-making for complex tasks, the relative speed of intuition may make it a more
appealing option. For example, organizational managers often find themselves in
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situations where perfect information relating to a particular business decision is not
available or takes too much time and money to obtain. In such situations, an intuitive
decision may be the most practical option.
When experts are considered, the present study found that those in the analysis
condition did not perform any better than those in the intuition condition. This finding is
relevant to research that explores the effect of analysis on expert judgment. When
information relevant to the decision is provided, one would expect an expert to be able to
identify the most pertinent set of information and use that data to make a good decision.
However, in the present study, the experts who were asked to analyze all the information
before making a decision did not do any better than those who were asked to ignore that
information and only use their intuition. It might be because, due to the complex
cognitive maps that are developed through years of training, experts are able to quickly
capture the information they need with a mere glance of the data (Chase & Simon,
1973a). Therefore, increased focus on analyzing the data may not necessarily provide
additional insight for experts.
Related to the above, it should be noted that the amount of information provided
to the participants of this study was not extensive. Accordingly, in an organizational
decision-making environment where more information is available to the decision maker,
it is yet to be empirically tested if experts are similarly able to quickly capture the
relevant information to make an effective intuitive decision. This would be an interesting
area for future research.
The most impactful finding of the present study is that experts made better
intuitive hiring decisions than non-experts. This finding is significant for two main
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reasons. First, it extends the prevalent argument in intuition research (i.e., that intuition is
an effective form of decision-making only when the decision maker is a domain expert)
to the arena of employee selection, and in a broader context, to the prediction of human
behavior. Thus far, most studies that empirically examine the impact of intuition has
focused on its effect on aspects such as solving practical problems (Pretz, 2008),
creativity (Dane et al., 2011), rating the difficulty of basketball shots, and authenticating
designer handbags (Dane et al., 2012). In the aforementioned studies, the focus is on an
individual’s intuitive ability to be successful in a particular task. But, the present study
takes this a step further by examining an individual’s intuitive ability to judge another
person’s capacity to be successful in a particular task (i.e., a job). Consequently, the
findings suggest that not only does expertise increase one’s intuitive ability to solve a
given task; expertise may also increase an individual’s intuitive ability to judge another
person’s capacity to be successful in a particular task.
Second, the result challenges the existing notion among scholars that the ability to
make good intuitive hiring decisions does not increase with experience [referred to as the
“myth of expertise” (Highouse, 2008b)]. As previously noted, an employee selection
environment typically has many characteristics that are considered to be conducive to
intuitive decision-making [i.e., uncertainty, complexity, time pressure, insufficient data,
and multiple solution possibilities (Agor, 1986; Baldacchino et al., 2015; Burke & Miller,
1999)]. This is especially true when recruiting for a complex job as intuition has been
found to be effective for complex tasks (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004). Given such an
environment that is prone to effective intuitive decision-making, the general intuition
research has shown that expertise does increase one’s ability to make effective intuitive
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decisions (e.g., Dane et al., 2012). Therefore, the findings of the present study suggest
that perhaps scholars were too premature in discounting the impact of expertise on
intuitive hiring without fully understanding when it might be useful (e.g., for a complex
job). The “myth of expertise” in employee selection may not be a myth after all.
It is important to note that the argument here is not that we should abandon
analytical hiring methods in favor of intuition. In fact, the experimental design of the
present study included elements that are consistent with analytical hiring techniques: 1)
the interview questions were developed through a laborious process following the critical
incident technique, 2) the interview questions were situational questions which are part of
a highly structured interview format, 3) the interviews were standardized where both
candidate responses were for the same interview question, and 4) decision aids were
provided in the form of the job dimension and its definition. Therefore, the argument is
that, when the interviewer is an expert and the job is complex, perhaps we should not
merely rely on analytical techniques but give some weight to the interviewer’s intuitive
judgment.
As previously noted, Dane et al. (2012) found that non-experts performed better
using analysis than intuition. Although the authors did not specify if the differences were
statistically significant, their results suggest that an analytical approach may be better for
non-experts than an intuitive approach. Through a post-hoc analysis, the present study
explored whether non-experts performed significantly better when they used an analytical
approach compared to an intuitive approach. While not originally hypothesized, this
result may provide useful insight as to what type of decision-making approach may be
better suited for non-experts (e.g., owners of a small family business). Because non-
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experts do not have the complex cognitive schemas that enable experts to make effective
intuitive decisions, their intuitive judgments are often nothing more than a guess with an
equal probability of being correct or incorrect. However, when non-experts use an
analytical approach, even though they may not know precisely what information is
critical to solving the problem (Pretz, 2008), the deliberate thinking process may unearth
elements that lead them towards, or at least increase their chances of, making the correct
decision. Therefore, when the decision maker is a non-expert, an analytical decisionmaking approach may be more effective than relying on their intuition.
With regard to the cognitive style of the decision maker, this study found that
those whose cognitive style matched the employee selection method did not perform
significantly better than those whose cognitive style did not match the employee selection
method. Prior research has found that individuals prefer to use a decision-making strategy
that is in line with their cognitive style (e.g., Chen et al., 2008, Miles & Sadler-Smith,
2014). Although congruence between cognitive style and strategy has, in some cases, led
to better outcomes (e.g., Brigham et al., Friedman et al., 1985), there is some evidence
that individuals may perform better when they use a decision strategy that is opposite to
their cognitive style (e.g., Dane et al., 2011). Further, as found in the present study, the
association between cognitive style and decision strategy may not impact decision quality
at all. Given these results, it seems that there may be other factors (e.g., task
characteristics) which influence the relationship between cognitive style, decision
strategy, and decision quality. Therefore, further exploration into contextual factors may
be required to fully understand these relationships.
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The second part of this study examined the impact of procedural accountability on
expert intuition. It was hypothesized that procedural accountability will have a negative
impact on an expert’s ability to make effective intuitive decisions. Contrary to the
hypothesis, the experts in the procedural accountability condition (M = 7.78) did slightly
better than those in the intuition condition (M = 7.56). However, it should be noted that
the difference between the groups was not significant. The finding that there is no
significant difference between the experts who were held accountable and those who
were not held accountable suggests that, within the context of this study, there is no dark
side to accountability. That is, within a complex organizational decision-making situation
such as employee selection, procedural accountability does not appear to have a negative
effect on expert intuition.
Academic Contributions and Practical Implications
This study makes several important contributions to academic research. First, this
study extends our understanding of intuition. Thus far, the conceptual development of
intuition has been limited due to the difficulty in directly examining the intuitive process
(Baylor, 2001). Since intuition is an unconscious, automatic, and rapid process, it is
challenging to assess the actual use of intuition. Due to the complications in measuring
the actual use of intuition, most studies measure one’s preference for intuitive decisionmaking (Blume & Covin, 2011) or use self-reported measures that rely on retroactive
accounts (e.g., Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014; Nowicki & Rosse,
2002, Pretz & Totz, 2007).
There are two issues with this methodology. One is that self-reported measures
are susceptible to recollection bias and the other is that people tend to glorify their
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successes while minimizing failures (Dimov, 2007). Especially because intuition is a
nonconscious and automatic process, it is difficult to assume that people will be able to
accurately recollect the cognitive process they used during a past event. In response,
scholars have called for the use of experimental methods to better capture the cognitive
process during the point of action (Baldacchino et al., 2015; Fisher, 2008; Hodgkinson &
Clark, 2007). As detailed in the research methodology section, through a rigorous
experimental design, this study adhered to this call by attempting to capture the actual use
of intuition at the point of action.
Second, there is a scarcity of applied research relating to intuition in general
(Khatri & Ng, 2000) and intuitive prediction of behavior in particular (Highhouse &
Kostek, 2013). More specifically, there is a lack of empirical work examining the role of
intuition in employee selection (Highhouse & Kostek, 2013; Miles & Sadler-Smith,
2014). Scholars have studied aspects such as the reasons an interviewer uses a particular
cognitive strategy (Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014) and the interviewer’s reaction to
intuitive or analytical selection methods (Chen et al., 2008). However, we had little
empirical evidence of how intuition, especially expert intuition, impacts the effectiveness
of a hiring decision. Through the findings of the present study, we now have a better
understanding of when intuition might be useful in employee selection (i.e., when the job
is complex and the interviewer is an expert).
Third, this study highlights the importance of context in employee selection
(Colarelli & Thompson, 2008). Scholars who argue that expert intuition is ineffective in
employee selection tend to generalize this notion without paying close attention to
contextual factors such as job complexity. In addition, not much is known about factors
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that affect the validity of analytical selection methods (Huffcutt et al., 2004). As a result,
we had limited knowledge of how contextual factors such as job complexity impact the
effectiveness of intuitive and analytical hiring processes. The present study attempted to
address this specific limitation by examining the impact of intuition when recruiting for
complex jobs. Further research is required to identify other possible contextual factors
that may impact intuitive hiring decisions.
Finally, scholars have called for future research to study cognition through the
lens of dual-process theory as opposed to the unitary view (Baldacchino et al., 2015). As
described earlier, the unitary view considers intuition and analysis to be opposite ends of
a single continuum (e.g., Allinson & Hayes, 1996; Baylor, 1997; Simon, 1992). Due to
issues with measurement, it has been argued that the unitary view should be abandoned
(Hodgkinson et al, 2009b). In contrast, the dual-process theory of cognition views
intuition and analysis as two separate independent systems (Sadler-Smith & BurkeSmalley, 2015). Although some of the intuitive and analytical style measurement items of
the Rational-Experiential-Inventory were eliminated during confirmatory factor analysis,
the scale still fit a two-factor model and there was no significant correlation between the
two factors. Accordingly, the results of the present study are consistent with the twofactor solution for intuition and analysis and therefore, support the dual process theory.
From a practitioner perspective, the findings of the present study provide some
insight as to when it may be acceptable to give some consideration to the role of intuition
when making hiring decisions. This study found that when recruiting for a complex job,
interviewer expertise has a positive impact on intuition. Furthermore, when the
interviewer is an expert, their intuitive decisions were as good as their analytical
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decisions. Therefore, perhaps it might be prudent to give some weight to an expert
interviewer’s intuitive judgment when hiring for complex jobs.
On the other hand, this study also found that non-expert interviewers perform
significantly better when using analysis than intuition. Accordingly, in situations where
the interviewers are non-experts (e.g., a new manager with no prior hiring experience), it
seems imperative that they are provided with the necessary training, tools, and processes
that will allow them to make analytical hiring decisions.
Limitations
As with any research, this study has a number of limitations. First, since intuition
is a nonconscious process, it is difficult to determine if the participants actually used
intuition in making their decisions. Although the method and instructions to prompt
intuitive decision-making was consistent with prior research (Dane et al., 2012; Pretz,
2008), and the final analysis only included the participants who successfully passed the
manipulation checks, it is still possible that some participants may not have entirely relied
on their intuition to make decisions. For instance, based on their responses to the
manipulation check questions, approximately 1/3 of the participants in the intuition
condition used analysis more than intuition. Even though they were asked to use intuition
alone, perhaps the participants were inclined to use their natural (or trained)
predisposition to be analytical.
Second, recall that in each interview scenario, one candidate response was good
and the other was average. The good-average response format, as opposed to a good-poor
response format, was used to reduce the contrast between the two candidate responses
and thereby make the decision to select the best response more complex. However, it is
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likely that the good-average response format made the decision to select the best response
too difficult which, in turn, may have affected the results.
Third, the dependent variable, accuracy of a hiring decision, was not a predictive
measure of job performance (i.e., a measure that assesses the actual job performance of
the interviewees). Recall that the candidate responses were scripted and validated through
a two-step process using expert samples. Although similar techniques have been used in
prior research (Maurer, 2002; Maurer & Lee, 2000), this type of validation may not be as
accurate as using actual interviewees and measuring their success through a subsequent
evaluation of their job performance.
Fourth, participants completed the experiment remotely (i.e., on their computers
at their desks) rather than in a more controlled lab environment. This method was used as
it induced a natural work environment since the candidate interviews are generally
conducted at the recruiters’ desks. Furthermore, the method adheres to the call from
scholars to conduct intuition research related to organizational decision-making in field
settings (Dane et al., 2012). However, compared to a lab environment, the method used in
this study does make the participants more susceptible to environmental factors that may
disrupt their task performance and/or their attention to study details. For example, there
were notable differences in task completion times among the participants.
Fifth, with regard to the manipulation to induce procedural accountability, about
38 percent of the participants failed the manipulation check. This result does bring up a
concern that participants may not have felt accountable. Since the participants completed
the experiment remotely with no direct contact with the researcher, perhaps they felt it
unlikely that would have to justify their decision-making approach to anyone. However,
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it should be noted that those who failed the manipulation check were not used in the final
analysis.
Sixth, half of the items in the Rational-Experiential-Inventory were removed
during confirmatory factor analysis in order to obtain acceptable model fit. In the final
model, the items that measured rational (i.e., analytical) and experiential (i.e., intuitive)
cognitive style were reduced to six and four respectively. There is some evidence that the
experiential scale may not be entirely unidimensional (Pretz and Totz, 2007) which might
explain the low factor loadings of many experiential scale items. In addition, having a
large number of reverse coded items may also have contributed to the issue.
Finally, the sample size was relatively small which limited statistical power.
Furthermore, although this study used a sample of real-world decision makers in their
natural work setting, it is still susceptible to a drawback of most experimental research,
which is limited generalizability (McGrath, 1981).
Directions for Future Research
The present study was an attempt to advance our knowledge of when intuition can
be useful to make hiring decisions. In doing so, it also extended our understanding of the
role of intuition in the broader decision-making arena. The insights gained from this
study provide numerous opportunities for future research.
For instance, this study explored the effect of intuition in an organizational
decision-making context, specifically employee selection. Due to the difficulties in
obtaining samples of organizational decision makers, most studies that empirically
examine the role of intuition has focused on tasks that are not closely related to
organizational decision-making situations (e.g., Dane et al., 2012; Dijksterhuis, 2004;
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Pretz, 2008). Therefore, for us to fully understand the effects of intuition for
organizational problems, more research needs to be conducted in real-world settings.
With regard to employee selection, this study found intuition to be helpful when the
interviewer is an expert and the candidate being recruited is a healthcare professional. To
support the generalizability of this result, it will be insightful to test if these findings hold
true for expert interviewers in other types of complex job settings such as executive level
positions.
In addition, advances in neuroscience provide an opportunity for intuition to be
measured through brain activity (Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2012; Lieberman, 2000). As
previously noted, the self-reported evidence of the use of intuition has its limitations in
being able to truly identify if an unconscious cognitive process such as intuition was
used. Thus, using neurological techniques to determine the role of intuition, especially in
organizational decision-making situations, may provide significant insights into the
impact of intuitive decision-making.
With regard to the relationship between cognitive style and its effect on decision
quality, this study did not find conclusive evidence to support an association. While some
prior research has found a match between cognitive style and decision strategy to produce
better outcomes (e.g., Friedman et al., 1985), there is some evidence that a mismatch may
be more desirable especially when it comes to increasing creativity (Dane et al., 2011).
Therefore, further research is required to understand when an individual’s cognitive style
impacts decision quality and when it does not.
Finally, even though a negative relationship between procedural accountability
and expert intuition was hypothesized, it was not supported in the present study. This
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result might be because the manipulation was not strong enough to induce the level of
accountability that may make an expert forego their intuition in favor of a decisionmaking approach that they could more easily justify. It will be interesting to see if a
controlled laboratory experiment with a stronger prompt for accountability provides a
different result. Furthermore, future research should also consider other contextual factors
that inhibit an expert’s ability to make effective decisions.
Conclusion
Although scholars have been studying intuition for decades, we still have a
limited understanding of what intuition is, how it works, and when it can be useful. The
purpose of the present study was to address the latter, which is, to expand our knowledge
of when intuition may be beneficial in an organizational decision-making environment
such as employee selection. By using a sample of real-world decision makers in their
natural setting, the study found that when the interviewer is an expert and the position
being hired for is complex; intuition is an effective way to make decisions. This finding is
significant to academic research as it extends our understanding of when intuition can be
useful to a domain (i.e., employee selection) where scholars have often discounted the
use of intuition. For practitioners, these findings suggest that, when conditions for
effective intuitive decision-making are sufficiently met, it may be prudent to give some
consideration to intuitive judgment.
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Table 11
Interview Questions and Answers
Job Dimension
Attention to Detail

Interview Question
In most of our
positions, you often
have a large patient
load and you’re in a
fast-paced
environment. What
would you do to
avoid medical
errors?

Attitude

A parent of one of
your underage
patients comes to
your office angry
and falsely accusing
you of not taking
proper care of her
son. How would
you respond?

Dependability

Let's say you accept
a position with us
and two days before
your start date, one

Good Answer
With each patient, I
would spend time
before seeing the
patient to go through
their medical
history. Then, I will
thoroughly evaluate
the patient and make
detailed notes of the
session. And after
each session, I will
review the file to
make sure I got
everything right
before I move on to
the next patient.
I would remain calm
and ask her politely
what is bothering
her. I will try to
empathize with her
situation as much as
I can and will avoid
arguing with her. I
will explain the
steps I have taken
with her son to show
her that I have
followed the correct
protocol in taking
care of her son.
After she leaves, I
will write a record
of her visit and the
conversation.
I will get another
family member or a
friend to help out
with my sick family

Average Answer
No matter how fast
paced the
environment is, it is
important to give
each patient the
time and attention
that is required to
give them proper
care. I would
thoroughly evaluate
their condition and
follow the correct
protocol in treating
the patient.
I will invite her into
my office and ask
her to have a seat. I
won’t argue with
her but I will be
clear that I have
done my best for
her son and assure
her that I will
continue to give
him the best care
possible. I will give
her my supervisor’s
contact information
and tell her that she
is welcome to talk
to my supervisor if
she has further
concerns.
I will call my
supervisor and
explain the situation
to her. I will let her
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of your family
members come
down with a cold.
What will you do?

Communication

Client Focus

Let's say you are
phone interviewing
for a position
with one of our
client facilities and
the manager says
to you "so, tell me
why you would be a
good fit for this
position?" How
would you respond?

member so that I
could report to work
on my start date.

I usually prepare for
an interview by
writing down key
points about my
background that I
think will be most
applicable to the
job. When I'm asked
that question, I will
present those points
so that the manager
can see how my
experience meets
the specific
requirements of the
position.
While working at
I will say yes to my
one of our client
supervisor and work
facilities, a need
out my schedule to
may arise where you accommodate
are asked to take on training the new
additional
employee. I have
responsibilities
previous experience
beyond your busy
training new
patient schedule.
employees while
Let’s say your
managing a large
supervisor at the
patient load.
client facility calls
you and asks if you
will be willing to
train one of
their new
employees. What

know that I will do
everything I can to
report to work on
time. But, in case
my family
member's sickness
doesn't get better, I
might have to delay
my start date a little.
I will take care of
my family member
and get to work as
soon as possible.
I always have my
resume in front of
me when I'm on a
phone interview. If
I'm asked that
question, I will
present my
experience in
reverse
chronological order
so that I can provide
the manager with a
thorough
understanding of
my skills and
experience.
Since I have a busy
patient schedule,
taking on this
responsibility may
have a negative
impact on attending
to my patients. So, I
will tell my
supervisor that I
will be happy to
train the new
employee if my
schedule can be
adjusted so that I
have time to do the
training.
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Flexibility

Honesty

Planning and
Organization

will you do?
Assume we made
you an offer for one
of our positions.
How would you
respond if the
position meets
everything you're
looking for with the
exception that the
pay is slightly below
what you're making
now?
Let's say you're
interviewing at one
of our client
facilities and the
hiring manager asks
you if you're able to
do a critical task.
This task, if done
incorrectly, may
have disastrous
consequences.
While you have a
basic understanding
of the task and little
experience with it,
you do have
extensive
experience with
similar tasks. How
would you respond?
You have a large
patient load so your
schedule is
hectic. As you
know, it is critical
that appropriate
forms, such as
Medicaid
reimbursement
forms, are
completed promptly
and thoroughly.

If the position meets
everything else that
I am looking for and
if the pay is
competitive for the
job location and the
job responsibilities,
I will take the
position even if it’s
a little less than
what I’m making
now.
I will let the
manager know the
extent of my
knowledge and
experience relating
to the task. I will let
him know that I am
willing to do the
task but will need
training.

I do have financial
obligations that I
have to meet so I
would need to make
at least what I'm
making right now.
Having said that, I
may take less if it's
the right
opportunity.

On every
appointment, I
allocate a few
minutes after the
meeting to review
the session and
make notes. Then,
on Friday
afternoons, I
normally block out a
few hours to
complete paperwork

If I have a large
caseload and a busy
schedule, I may not
have time during
regular work hours
to complete
paperwork. So,
what I usually do is
complete all the
paperwork during
weekends.

I will tell the
manager about the
amount of
experience I have
with that task. But, I
am a fast learner
and since I have
extensive
experience with
similar tasks, I will
tell the manager that
I can do the task.
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How would you
manage that?

Professionalism

You discovered an
error you made in
treating a patient. It
was a minor error
and there is no
noticeable harm to
the patient. What
will you do?

Responsiveness

During the
recruiting process
with our company, I
may need to contact
you urgently with
regard to a
placement at one of
our clients. In case
you're on vacation,
how will I be able to
reach you?

for the entire week.
My session notes
help me to make
sure I'm not missing
any information.
I will report the
error to my
supervisor. I will
also take
precautions to avoid
making the same
error again.

I will contact the
patient and inform
her of the mistake.
Also, I will take the
necessary steps so
that I don't make the
same mistake again.

If I need to go on
vacation, I will give
you multiple ways
you can contact me
before I go. So, you
will be able to get a
hold of me quickly
if you try to reach
me.

I'll give you my cell
number before I go
on vacation. I check
my messages
periodically so I
should be able to
get back with you
soon if you try to
reach me.
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Sample Interview Scenario as seen by Participants
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Appendix B
Figure 12
Sample Interview Scenario as seen by Participants

APPENDIX C
Instructions for the Intuition Condition
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Appendix C
Figure 13
Instructions for the Intuition Condition
Please follow the instructions below when selecting the best response:


Select the first choice that comes to your mind



Avoid thinking very hard about what the “right” answer is



Let your intuition and gut instinct guide you and make the decision
that feels right to you



Your decision should be based on your first impression about the
candidates



Do not try to analyze information or apply additional logic beyond your
intuitive response

APPENDIX D
Instructions for the Analysis Condition
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Appendix D
Figure 14
Instructions for the Analysis Condition
Please follow the instructions below when selecting the best response:


Do not select the first choice that comes to your mind



Carefully consider all available information before making a decision



You should analyze the options and make your decision in
a logical and systematic way



Ignore any first impression or gut instinct based choices

APPENDIX E
Instructions for the Intuition-Procedural Accountability Condition
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Appendix E
Figure 15
Instructions for the Intuition-Procedural Accountability Condition
Please note that at the end of the exercise you may be asked to write a
brief explanation of the process you followed when selecting the best
response.
Please follow the instructions below when selecting the best response:


Select the first choice that comes to your mind



Avoid thinking very hard about what the “right” answer is



Let your intuition and gut instinct guide you and make the decision
that feels right to you



Your decision should be based on your first impression about the
candidates



Do not try to analyze information or apply additional logic beyond your
intuitive response

